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The Public Health Sector in Peru primarily serves the poor. Its performance, as measured by health 
status outcomes, has been positive in some areas such as immunization coverage, reduction of infant 
mortality, and increases in institutional baby deliveries. However, there are still problems that need to be
addressed such as maternal mortality and cross-sectoral issues such as full equity and risk protection. But 
from a budgetary perspective, there is no clear correlation between the amount of money allocated and
health outcomes. This is explained by the fact that there is no established causality between inputs and
results and that the processes in expending public monies are cumbersome, not transparent, inefficient,
and full of loopholes that have created perverse incentives. 
 
The main objective of the study was to gain a clear understanding of the logic and sequence of budget
flows and to discover bottlenecks throughout the process that can impede the adequate use of limited
resources. In addition, the study reviews the relationship between flows and expenditures, on the one
hand, and the flows and decision-making process on the other hand. In as much as possible, the study 
follows Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) Methodology and applies it to one health cluster in
Metropolitan Lima.  
 
The study was exploratory but results were promising and the implementation of a survey gave us
enough information to firmly state that “it is not only a question of how much money the sector is
assigned, but also of how and when the resources reach the frontline providers”. The analysis of frontline
providers and intermediate-level agencies in this study identified institutional bottlenecks and possible 
perverse incentives that reduce positive budget incidence. Constraints and perverse incentives are present
in the salary structure, the use of fee collection and petty cash management, procurement rules, and
elsewhere. The current context in Peru, where a Results-Based Budget is being piloted, provides an 
opportunity to incorporate adjustments in the management processes. 
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I was chatting with a very well-known health 
professional and beginning to explain our research on 
the health sector budget and its focus on a national 
program. The professional immediately interrupted 
and commented: “they [the program] do not have 
budget problems — they have money from donors.” 
Then I realized that most of us have an inadequate 
understanding of budgetary issues and we tend to 
reduce the scope of the problem to the amount of 
money we can get from donors or the Ministry of 
Economy.   
 
 
 
It is not only a question of how much 
money the sector is assigned, but also of how 
and when the resources reach to the frontline 
providers. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
BU Budget Units (Unidades Ejecutoras) 
 
CLAS  Local Health Administration Committee (Comité Local de 
Administración de la Salud) 
 
CONSUCODE Superior Council for State Procurement and Contracting (Consejo 
Superior de Contrataciones y Adquisiciones del Estado) 
 
DEMID  Executive Directorate of Pharmaceuticals, Supplies, and Drugs 
(Dirección Ejecutiva de Medicamentos, Insumos y Drogas) 
 
DGSP General Directorate of Personal Health (Dirección General de Salud de 
las Personas) 
 
DIGEMID General Directorate of Pharmaceuticals, Supplies, and Drugs  
(Dirección General de Medicamentos, Insumos y Drogas) 
 
DIRESA Regional Health Directorate (Dirección Regional de Salud) 
 
DISA Health Directorate (Dirección de Salud)  
 
DNPP National Directorate of the Public Budget (Dirección Nacional del 
Presupuesto Público)  
 
ENAHO Nacional Household Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares) 
 
ESsalud Social Security (Seguridad Social) 
 
FFAA Army (Fuerzas Armadas) 
 
HN Health Network (Red de Salud) 
 
IDREH  Human Resources Development Institute of the Ministry of Health 
(Instituto de Desarrollo de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Salud)  
 
MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y 
Finanzas) 
 
MINSA  Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) 
 
MML   Metropolitan Lima 
 
PAAG Program for the Administration of Management Agreements 
(Programa de Administración de Acuerdos de Gestión)  
 
PECOSA Proof of Departure Document (Pedido de Comprobante de Salida) 
 
RBB Results-Based Budget (Presupuesto por Resultados) 
 
 
Universidad del Pacifico Research Center 4
 
SEACE Electronic System for State Procurement and Contracting (Sistema 
Electrónico de Adquisiciones y Contrataciones del Estado) 
 
SERUM Rural and Urban Marginal Health Service (Servicio Rural y Urbano 
Marginal de Salud)  
 
SIAF Integrated System for Financial Information (Sistema Integrado de 
Administración Financiera) 
 
SIS Integral Health Insurance (Seguro Integral de Salud)  
 
SISMED Integrated System of Pharmaceutical Provisions and Supplies (Sistema 
Integrado de Suministros e Insumos Médico-Quirúrgicos) 
 
UIT Tax Unit (Unidad Impositiva Tributaria)  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Public Health Sector in Peru primarily serves the poor. Its performance, as measured by 
health status outcomes, has been positive in some areas such as immunization coverage, 
reduction of infant mortality, and increases in institutional baby deliveries. However, there are 
still problems that need to be addressed such as maternal mortality and cross-sectoral issues 
such as full equity and risk protection. But from a budgetary perspective, there is no clear 
correlation between the amount of money allocated and health outcomes. This is explained by 
the fact that there is no established causality between inputs and results and that the processes 
in expending public monies are cumbersome, not transparent, inefficient, and full of loopholes 
that have created perverse incentives. 
 
The main objective of the study was to gain a clear understanding of the logic and sequence of 
budget flows and to discover bottlenecks throughout the process that can impede the adequate 
use of limited resources. In addition, the study reviews the relationship between flows and 
expenditures, on the one hand, and the flows and decision-making process on the other hand. 
In as much as possible, the study follows Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) 
Methodology and applies it to one health cluster in Metropolitan Lima.  
 
The study was exploratory but results were promising and the implementation of a survey 
gave us enough information to firmly state that “it is not only a question of how much money 
the sector is assigned, but also of how and when the resources reach the frontline providers”. 
The analysis of frontline providers and intermediate-level agencies in this study identified 
institutional bottlenecks and possible perverse incentives that reduce positive budget 
incidence. Constraints and perverse incentives are present in the salary structure, the use of 
fee collection and petty cash management, procurement rules, and elsewhere. The current 
context in Peru, where a Results-Based Budget is being piloted, provides an opportunity to 
incorporate adjustments in the management processes.  
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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This report summarizes the findings of research carried out in Peru employing Public 
Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) methodology as much as possible. The study focuses on 
the Health Sector in Metropolitan Lima and was carried out from March to June 2008. The 
main objective of the study was to clearly understand the logic and sequence of budget flows 
and to discover bottlenecks in the process that may be limiting the appropriate use of limited 
resources. By applying this methodology, it was also possible to review the relationship 
between flows and expenditures and the decision-making process.  
 
As has been noted, “primary expenditure concern that often is not systematically understood 
or followed by government expenditure systems is how much money actually gets to service 
delivery outlets, how well the service outlets function, and what can be done to improve the 
prevailing situation”(sic) (RFP 2007). In the case of Peru, from a budgetary perspective, there 
is no positive correlation between the amount of money allocated and some health outcomes. 
This is explained by the fact that there is no established causality between inputs and results 
and that the processes involved in spending public monies are cumbersome, not transparent, 
sometimes inefficient, and full of loopholes that have created perverse incentives in the 
system. 
 
The character of this study is exploratory due to the reduced timeframe for its implementation. 
However the results are very promising in the sense that the methodology permitted 
identification of institutional bottlenecks and possible perverse incentives for frontline 
providers that reduce positive budget incidence. As a complementary product, two ad hoc 
surveys for future PETS studies were tested: one for health clinics and the other for Health 
Networks. This study was independently proposed to the public sector and conducted by the 
Research Center of the Universidad del Pacífico. The results are based on observations and 
information collected by an independent monitoring institution. The application of the study 
tested transparency in the sector and followed the documentary process to get final clearance 
at the level of health facilities. It is not easy for agents external to the sector to collect public 
information inside facilities unless the objectives, methodology, and instruments have been 
approved at all levels. 
 
This report is organized into five sections. The first and second sections present an overview 
and the methodology. The third section discusses the fiscal context of the application of the 
study and the fourth section outlines the main findings related to constraints and incentives in 
the system. Finally, section five presents conclusions and recommendations. 
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B. OVERVIEW 
 
 
Budgets represent policy makers’ commitment to a set of goods and services in terms of 
coverage and quality as well as other standards. When a budget fails to deliver these, this can 
be due to many factors such as ineffective processes, leakages, or other constraints. The 
following seccion presents some issues that clarify how these failures can occur. 
  
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) in Perspective 
 
Some studies such as Musgrove 1996, Filmer and Pritchett 1999, and Filmer et al. 2000 found 
that analysis of public expenditures does not tell us anything about outcomes for the 
population served. These studies demonstrated that even when the amount of money spent in 
each sector increased, the results did not improve. Therefore, the researchers concluded that 
increases in levels of public expenditure are not a significant variable. 
 
There are several reasons why the expenditure in a public policy initiative may not have the 
expected impact: 
1. Expenditures are made on goods that would otherwise be purchased by households. 
Therefore, the policy deviates into crowding out private spending. 
2. The wrong beneficiaries are identified.  
3. Money does not reach the service provider. 
4. There is a lack of monetary and non-monetary incentives for service providers to offer 
quality services. Moreover they are underpaid and not supervised. 
5. People are uninformed about the services and do not use them. 
 
In response to the claim that there is no role for public policy, and considering points 3 and 4 
above, Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) methodology points out that analyzing 
the impact of a budgetary transfer of money at its source is insufficient to ascertain whether 
service providers will receive the amount of money budgeted for them (some may receive less 
or the monies may have been diluted). Therefore, looking for results on the basis of the 
complete transfer may not be accurate. PETS methodology was first applied in Uganda in 
1996 in a study of the educational and health sectors in order to understand the reasons for the 
fact that, despite an important increase in expenditures in both sectors, there was stagnation or 
even a decline in outcomes. In this case and others, PETS attempts to identify possible 
leakages in the flow of a service provision that diminish the benefits of a particular service: 
“PETS examines flows of funds and materials from a central government to local service 
providers, via regional and local governments, in order to identify resource use and leakages” 
(Gauthier 2006). 
 
There are some levels or transactions that typically present leakages: 
 
1. Rule-based versus discretionary expenditures: ruled-based expenditures suffer less 
from leakages in comparison to autonomous fundraising processes, the latter is 
associated with more bargaining power.  
2. Wage versus non-wage expenditures: wage expenditures are normally paid for directly 
by the central government so leakage is not an issue. On the other hand, bureaucrats 
and politicians can take advantage of non-wage expenditures since they have more 
information than others. 
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3. Levels of government: the probability of leakage is higher whenever a flow passes 
through several levels of government. Nonetheless, depending on country-specific 
organizational structures, there may be some levels of government in which leakage is 
more pronounced.   
4. In-kind versus cash transfers: leakage is more pronounced in in-kind transfers than in 
cash transfers since recepients usually do not know the value of the in-kind transfer 
they are receiving. 
 
All these possible leakages are the result of the moral hazard problem that exists due to 
information asymmetry and the existence of different goals on the part of the principal 
(client/citizen) and the agent (service provider) as well as the diminished power that clients 
have in terms of regulating government management of their taxes.  The Accountability 
Triangle Paradigm, also developed by the World Bank summarizes the relationships between 
agents.1 The directions of the arrows symbolize the principal-agents relations.  On the right 
(contract) side, service providers are accountable to the policy maker; the base of the triangle 
(client power) depicts the relation between service providers as agents who are accountable to 
clients; and finally the third side known as citizens’ voice represents citizens overseeing the 
performance of public sector who is accountable to voters.  It is in the last relationship that the 
use of PETS strengthens citizens’ watchdog role. (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Accountability Triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PETS has three main goals: (i) analysis, (ii) diagnosis, and (iii) impact evaluation. PETS is a 
tool that can highlight not only problems in the provision of a service but also the causes of 
these problems. It can also be integrated into impact evaluations since it provides more 
information about the process of a service. All this leads to increased information about social 
sector spending associated to outcomes. 
 
Accumulated experience with PETS worldwide falls into three categories: studies dealing 
with a high degree of accounting and numbers for triangulation of money transferred between 
agents, looking more deeply into leakages; a second group of studies that emphasizes 
institutional rules and loopholes, and a third group of studies, which has a research profile 
(Savedoff, 2008). The character of the present study, as judged by its researchers, falls 
between the second and third group. 
                                                 
1 See Cotlear (2006) to follow up the paradigm of accountability in social sectors.   
Government / 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Objective 
 
This research follows Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) methodology in as much 
as possible and applies it to the health sector in Peru.  
 
The main objective of the study is to clearly understand the logic and sequence of budget 
flows and to discover bottlenecks and possible leakages throughout the process that may be 
limiting the adequate use of limited resources. As a result of applying this methodology, this 
study was also able to review the relationship between flows and expenditures and the 
decision-making process. The results of this study reinforce the findings of a previous 
research study on the limitations to the full implementation of a Results-Based Budget 
(Alvarado et al. 2008). For the case of Peru, this study analyzes budget flows from the 
Ministry of Economy to the Ministry of Health and intermediate level agencies and then to 
frontline providers (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Application of PETS methodology to the Health Sector in Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The character of this study is exploratory due to the reduced timeframe. However, the results 
are very promising in the sense that the methodology permitted the identification of 
institutional bottlenecks and possible perverse incentives among frontline providers that 
reduce positive budget  incidence.  
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Three factors that shaped the methodology employed should noted:  
• Sample. The units of analysis are homogeneous types of facilities. The sample consists 
of urban Health Centers and Health Posts (identified throughout the document as 
facilities or health facilities) in the metropolitan area of the Peruvian capital. Results 
could be extrapolated to the rest of the centralized Health Networks located in Lima. 
• The study analyzes various aspects of the management of healthcare delivery and 
provides an in-depth analysis of the delivery process of two public health programs: 
Vaccination and Tuberculosis Prevention and Control.   
• Variables of analysis. The process is analyzed according to timeliness, transparency, 
incentives, volatility, and its relationship to authority and decision-making. The 
requisite information was collected in health facilities and Health Networks through 
the administration of a survey and in interviews.  
 
Sources of data 
 
This study uses quantitative and qualitative data. The main sources of the quantitative data 
are: official public budget data published on the Internet, surveys administered in health 
facilities, and other administrative data from agencies:   
• The Integrated Financial Management System (SIAF) database created by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). 
• The Electronic Government Procurement and Contracting System (SEACE) reports 
managed by the Superior Council for State Procurement and Contracting 
(CONSUCODE). 
• Administrative data and legal documents from the Ministry of Health. 
• Administrative data from one Health Directorate. 
• Administrative data from one Health Network. 
• Tabulated data from the survey administered by CIUP in health facilities and health 
network. 
 
 
Focus on Vaccinations and Tuberculosis Prevention and  Control programs 
 
The Health Sector has many services, products, and type of beneficiaries. There are some 
common problems and others issues related to the management of specific services. To 
understand such specific cases, the study focused on the National Strategies for Vaccination 
and the Tuberculosis Prevention and Control. To this end, a specific track (follow-up) was 
done regarding inputs and petty cash for these two programs. These two programs were 
selected on the basis of information obtained during interviews with health sector personnel. 
 
• The Vaccination National Strategy has been identified as a “program with problems.” 
by the interviewed professionals. Its beneficiaries are primarily children and the 
Peruvian government has identified this target population group as its main priority for 
all public policies (health, education, and nutrition). The purpose of focusing on this 
program was to determine if it was administered in accordance with established 
national policies or if the final providers experienced any constraint. 
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• The National Strategy for Tuberculosis Prevention and Control received donations 
from the Global Fund of Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria which augmented its 
budget. Tuberculosis is a disease that primarily affects the urban poor. The program 
has had positive outcomes but has also received criticism because there has been a rise 
in multidrug resistant tuberculosis in Peru. This study sought out factors limiting the 
budget flow of funds earmarked for this program. 
 
 Detailed information on these programs can be found in Annex 5. 
 
 
2. Process of applying PETS in this study 
 
The designed process had three steps. It is important to keep in mind that even though PETS 
uses secondary data, its main input is primary data from surveys. These surveys cannot be 
designed in exactly the same way in each country due to multiple factors including: each 
survey must be tailored to the objective of the study and surveys must be designed keeping in 
mind that each health system is organized differently and has a greater or lesser number of 
agents, levels, and budget units. Consequently, the researchers decided to start by getting 
better acquainted with the functioning of the system and carried out interviews in order to be 
able to construct flows. The survey was then designed in accordance with the information 
collected.  
 
a. From interviews to budget flows 
 
It was crucial to understand the flows before constructing the surveys (questions and 
structure). However, a curious circular loop developed in this research: authorities and 
professionals wanted to see the survey before committing to interviews while the research 
team needed to carry out the interviews in order to design the survey. 
 
PETS can not be applied in a mechanical manner. Instruments have to be adjusted according 
to each country, taking into consideration the country’s context and the organization and size 
of its health system. In addition, the specific objective of the study is also important. In this 
case, the study is specifically focused on institutional constraints and bottlenecks and 
therefore a good grasp and knowledge of flows was necessary. 
 
Taking these factors into consideration, three actions were carried out: (i) administration of 
open interviews of key informants and specialists in budgetary issues; (ii) analysis of the legal 
framework to understand standard institutional processes; (iii) a review of the Peruvian 
government’s Integrated Financial Management System (SIAF) on the internet.  
 
As a result, three models of main budgets flows were constructed: cash or monetary flow, in-
kind flows (mainly pharmaceuticals), and salary-related flows. An additional flow of 
information was added to fully understand the SIS process. More arrows symbolizing the 
transfer of information can be done to evaluate the monitoring system; in this case we only 
included the ones related to SIS. The construction of flows required the identification of 
agencies and actors that intervene in the process from central agencies to frontline providers. 
Some “hot points” were selected from each flow for further analysis on the basis of 
information obtained from the initial interviews. These hot points (that revealed some 
bottlenecks), together with the identified variables, were included in the survey.  
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b. Budget records analysis 
 
Budget records obtained on the internet (SIAF) were also analyzed to crosscheck information 
gathered from the interviews. For this purpose, the team identified the accounts of the 
Regional Directorate and the Health Network selected as part of our sample cluster. All 
expenditures were identified: human resources, goods and services, and investment. 
 
c. Survey design, validation, and administration 
 
The survey was designed taking into consideration: the objective of the study, analysis 
variables, the Peruvian Health System’s characteristics and budget flows. The variables were: 
timeliness, transparency, incentives, volatility, autonomy of the frontline providers. 
  
The survey was administered to health facility and Health Network staff who are in charge of 
stock management, pharmacies, laboratories, cashier services, petty cash, insurance claims, 
human resources and service provision related to vaccinations and tuberculosis. Two types of 
surveys were developed, one for the health facilities and one for the Health Network (see 
annexes 9 and 10).2 
 
In the case of the health facilities, depending on the level of openness of the interviewee 
organizational issues, and availability of personnel (free time to answer the questionnaire), the 
administration of the survey lasted two complete workdays (9 am to 2 pm) on average. In 
some cases, the interviewers had to return three or four times to complete the information or 
had to make follow-up calls.  
 
Main areas covered by the survey include: 
 
1. Characteristics of the facility and the Head Doctor 
2. Number and type personnel and contracts 
3. Goods, stocks, timelines 
4. Equipment, procurement 
5. Pharmaceuticals, stocks, procurement  
6. Monitoring and supervision 
7. Public Health Insurance, claims 
8. Vaccination services, inputs 
9. Tuberculosis control, inputs 
10. Management of fees and petty cash 
 
d. Sampling 
 
The universe is made up of five Health Directorates (DISAS) in the city of Metropolitan 
Lima (MML). The universe corresponds to a centralized model, where the funds are 
transferred from the Ministry of Economy to the Ministry of Health, from the Ministry to 
                                                 
2 It is interesting to note that the process of getting clearance to apply PETS methodology by an external entity 
from civil society took almost three months, in the best of the cases, to get clearance from the Ministry, Health 
Directorate, Health network, Health Micro network.  Health facilities courteously  accepted to be surveyed once 
the clearance was obtained through formal channels.     
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the Health Directorates, from the Directorates to the Health Networks and, finally, from 
the Networks to the frontline providers.  
 
MML has a population of approximately 8 million and is Peru’s biggest urban center. 
There are four Directorates: 
 
Health Directorate I Callao  
Health Directorate II South Lima (DSLS)   
Health Directorate IV East Lima (DISA IV LE)  
Health Directorate V Central or City Lima (DISA V LC) 
 
Each Health Directorate (DISA) has several Health Networks. For our purposes, each network 
is a cluster.  
 
A larger sample would have permitted the extrapolation of results to a bigger universe, but 
due to time constraints, the study focused on one cluster: the Barranco-Chorrillos-Surco 
Network of the South Lima Directorate. Health facilities from this network were selected 
from the primary healthcare facilities. In order to reduce the provider’s diversity, the target 
population was a group of Health Centers with similar characteristics. Some Health Posts with 
the same dimensions as a Health Center were also included. Altogether, all Health Centers 
classified as level C I-3, C I-4 were surveyed—a total of 14 facilities—with more than 100 
staff members surveyed with an average of 8 professionals and technicians per facility. The 
geographical distribution of the facilities is shown on Map 1. See Annex 2 for detailed 
characteristics of the South Lima Directorate. 
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D. MACRO VIEW OF THE BUDGET PROCESS 
 
1. Organization 
 
Peru’s Budget is organized into Budget Units or Pliegos (BU) and Expenditure Units or 
Unidades Ejecutoras (EU). Normally line ministries and special independent institutions are 
Budget Units. In the Health Sector, the Budget Units are the Ministry of Health and the public 
insurer “Integral Health Insurance” (SIS). Under most of the Budget Units – in this case the 
Ministry of Health – there are Expenditure Units. Even though the insurer SIS is a Budget 
Unit and has relative independence in managing its budget, the head of SIS is appointed by 
the Ministry of Health and depends entirely on the sector’s policies. 
 
The Health Directorates (DISA)3 and the Health Networks (HN) in Metropolitan Lima and 
Callao4 are Expenditure Units and are the level that is authorized to spend and manage a 
budget, which includes the ability to hire and contract human resources. Health Networks 
depend functionally on the Health Directorates. Health facilities are not EU—they are only 
authorized to spend very small amounts through petty cash for emergencies and unbudgeted 
small items. 
 
Main sources of financing are ordinary resources (from national taxes) and own source 
revenues (which include fee collection from non-insured patients and SIS reimbursements). 
The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) prepares its budgets taking into consideration 
not only ordinary sources (recursos ordinarios) but also fee collection earnings (recursos 
directamente recaudados) from non-insured patients based on historical records. 
 
There is also another type of financing source that consists of budgetary grants and transfers 
(donaciones y transferencias) from international technical cooperation that is primarily used 
for training and operational travel costs for the staff of Health Directorates, Health Networks 
or facilities.5 In addition, some offices of the Ministry of Health send cash and goods  directly 
to the Health Directorates. 
 
SIS reimbursement receives special treatment. First, it is classified as ordinary resources when 
it goes from the MEF to SIS and then is classified as own collected resources in the Health 
Networks when it is send from SIS as a reimbursement.  
 
 
2. Budget cycle 
 
Traditionally, the budget in Peru has been rigid. Currently, only 5 percent of the budget is 
being piloted to introduce a Results-Based Budget in five strategic programs, mostly related 
to the social sector. 
 
Public resources are governed according to the General Law of the National Budget System 
(Law No. 28411) and the laws of the Public Sector Budget each fiscal year. These laws cover 
the three levels of government (central, regional, and local) as well as the Business Treatment 
                                                 
3 Called Regional Health Directorates (DIRESA) outside of Lima.  
4 Metropolitan Lima and Callao include 42 districts in the Province of Lima and 6 districts in Province of Callao. 
Together these provinces form one continuous urban area. 
5 Altobelli, Laura C., Ana U. Sovero and Ricardo Diaz R (2004). Cost-efficiency study of CLAS associations. 
Altobelli, Laura C., Ana U. Sovero and Ricardo Diaz R. Future Generations - Peru. 
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Entities-ESDP (Entidades de Tratamiento Empresarial - ETE) and determine budget 
appropriations for each budget statement (pliego presupuestario). 
 
In the budget system, the National Directorate of the Public Budget (DNPP) in the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (MEF), is responsible for scheduling, directing, coordinating, and 
evaluating the management of the budget process. In order to do this, the DNPP summarizes 
the requirements of public entities and structures the proposal for THE ANNUAL Budget 
Law. 
  
There are four basics steps in the budget process (Figure 3): programming and formulation; 
debate and appropriation; execution; and, finally, evaluation. Due to the great number of fixed 
expenditures, the process has been converted into a rigid and bureaucratic exercise.6  
 
 
Figure 3. The budget cycle and stakeholders in Peru 
 
Source: Alvarado et al. (2008) 
 
During the programming phase, maximum amounts of expenditures are approved for each  
agency. Theoretically, each agency tries to cover all the expected results with the allowed 
financing. However, budget items related to salaries and fringe benefits and pensions make 
most of the budget. So every year, the same structure is more or less set, depending on 
previous commitments. 
 
This budget prepared by the Ministry of Economy is sent to the Congress whose members 
discuss and approve it and appropriate the funds by passing the Budget Law.  
 
Finally, during the evaluation phase, actual expenses are compared with the approved budget. 
Since there is an incentive “to spend,” agencies just execute without taking into consideration 
products, results or impact. 
                                                 
6 More information can be found in Alvarado et al. 2008. 
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3. Health Financing in Peru 
 
Peru has the lowest level of health expenditures as a percentage of GDP in Latin America. In 
2004 (most recent comparable international data), Peru only spent 4 percent of GDP7 on 
health and only half of this was public money. In a context of informality, with low ratios of 
insurance by the social security system8 and a growing public insurer (SIS), the high level of 
out-of-pocket expenses clearly reflects the problems of inequality and low coverage in some 
health services (Figure 4). 
  
Figure 4. Health expenditure in Latin America as percentage of GDP, 2004 
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Source: Alvarado et al. 2008. 
 
In nominal terms, out of the 51 million soles in the national budget initially approved in 2007, 
4.8 million soles were allocated to health and sanitation functions, representing 9 percent of 
the total budget. As is the case with the education function, the allocation of resources for 
health expenditures has been stagnant in real terms for years, even though the country is 
experiencing economic growth (Figure 5). 
 
                                                 
7 The 2005 National Health Accounts estimated 4.5 percent of GDP for Peru. 
8 Social Security or Essalud is an independent public body with its own board and management and is financed 
basically by private sector and public employees payrolls. Essalud reports to the Ministry of Labor and not to the 
Ministry of Health. 
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Figure 5. Budget allocation according to public function: 2002-2007  
(millions de soles) 
 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Adm. and planning P ensions  & social benefits
Defense & national security Others
Education and culture Health and sanitation
9%
8%
9%
9%9%
9%
16%
17%
18% 18%
18%
17%
3 5  tho us a nd 
m illio ns  
5 1 tho us a nd 
m illio ns
 
 
 
Source: SIAF-MEF 
Prepared by CIUP, Universidad del Pacífico. 
*Percentage shows the share of health and education respectively. 
*Approved and appropriated Budget for 2007. 
*Local governments are not included because they do not all report to SIAF yet and it is not available 
yet. 
 
 
4. Budget flows 
 
As noted above, the implementation of PETS methodology has varied depending on the 
country where it has been applied. In this study, it was decided to first map budget flows 
following the money. The flows provide an overview of how and where the money goes. The 
organization of budget flows is inspired by the scheme developed by Gauthiers (2006).9 All 
the flows interact, but the team separated cash or monetary flow, in-kind flow (pharmaceutical 
and non-pharmaceutical), salary-financing flow, and information flow. Interviews with 
professionals involved in budget management and sector logistics made it possible to 
construct what we call a “spaghetti budget flow”10 to represent the multiple existing channels 
for the provision of funds in cash and in-kind for health providers. Following the money and 
the multiple flows not only depicts a complex system that reduces transparency but also 
reveals constraints that make the public budget less effective.  
 
To facilitate the presentation of results, figures 6, 7, and 8 include some dots11 next to the 
process arrows that indicate that an issue or problem was detected and is discussed in the 
findings as “hot points”. It should be noted that the flows presented correspond to the 
                                                 
9 Gauthier, Bernard. PETS-QSDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: A stocktaking Study. HEC Montreal, September 7,  
2006. 
10 This term was used in Argentina during the 1990s to describe the flow of the intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer’s model. 
11 
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centralized portion of the system, located in the city of Lima, the main urban center in Peru. 
This urban region, which is the main health market in per capita terms, is still managed by the 
Ministry of Health. In the rest of the country, health facilities are dependencies of the 
Regional Governments. 
 
In terms of the cash flow (Figure 6), there are not many surprises at the beginning of the 
process. The Ministry of Economy appropriates the funds and they are registered in the 
Integrated Financial Administration System (SIAF). Actual expenditures have to be registered 
and cleared (each time a check is issued)—this method makes it very difficult to procure  
without a pipeline of funds. These funds reach the intermediate agencies that are budgetary 
executing units (Health Directorates, Health Networks and Hospitals). These units are 
authorized to hire and pay personnel and make the main purchases of goods and services. 
Facilities for primary health care are not supposed to buy goods and services unless there is an 
emergency or the amount involved is very small and paid for only from petty cash.  
 
Two hot points have been found that are of concern:  
• Insurance claims rejected by the system during the process for different reasons.  
• The way that fees and petty cash are managed. The latter may be causing inequitable 
cross subsidies in the sector and perverse incentives to personnel.  
 
The next flow in Figure 7 refers to in-kind flows related mostly to pharmaceuticals. There are 
two main entities responsible for purchases of drugs and sanitary inputs: the Ministry of 
Health and the Health Directorates. One of the main concerns expressed during the first field 
observations were that some products were out of stock in the facilities’ pharmacies, which 
forced the staff to make non-optimal decisions. As will be explained below, there are 
problems in programming (facilities) and purchases (Directorates). In addition, Health 
Networks are responsible for the procurement of office supplies and cleaning goods, and 
furniture. Procurement and public purchases management in intermediate bodies appeared to 
be the most fragile points in sector operations. A description of the whole process is provided 
in Annex 6.  In summary, the problems identified by the staff initially interviewed were: 
• Programming at the level of health facilities 
• Distribution at Health Directorate warehouses (SIS and non-SIS) 
• Distribution of office and cleaning supplies from Health Networks to health facilities 
 
 
The third flow depicted in Figure 8 is related to human resources salaries, fringe benefits and 
bonuses and is one of the most important in terms of burden on the cost structure. Most 
personnel are paid directly by Health Directorates and/or Health Networks and a few are paid 
by SIS. Salaries are deposited in individual bank accounts and are registered in the SIAF 
system. Totals are clearly identified in the system. However, one issue stands out: some 
monetary payment incentives are decided upon in the Networks and are paid by each Network 
with resources from fees collected in the facilities to compensate for production incentives. 
The issue has to do with: 
• Policies, payment stability related to sources of funds, and incentives for personnel 
affecting equity and sector efficiency. 
 
 
Finally, an analysis of the three flows depicted in Figure 9 (plus the information flow) 
indicates that transparency is reduced as a result of so many flows. These and other findings 
are discussed in the next section. 
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Figure 6. Cash flow12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This section follows Gauthier’s (2006) suggestions on how to construct flows. 
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Figure 7. In-kind (pharmaceutical) flows 
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Figure 8. Human Resources flow 
 
 
 
Ministry of 
Economy 
(Treasury) 
Health 
Network EU
Facility
Facility
Health 
Directorate 
(DISA) EU
Ministry of 
Health, BU
PAAG Public Insurer 
SIS, BU 
Using SIS 
money for 
hiring 
SISMED
Fund 
(DISA) Part of this fundcan be used for
hiring 
Hiring with PAAG
funds is done
through DISA 
 
 
Own resources
can be used for
hiring 
 
Network gives 
monetary and 
non-monetary 
“incentives” to 
facility workers
Salaries
Information
Monetary
 
SISMED Integrated Pharmaceutical System 
PAAG Office for Management Agreements 
 
Possible bottlenecks (hot points) 
BU Budget Units 
EU Expenditure Units 
SIS Seguro Integral de Salud 
 
 
 
Universidad del Pacifico Research Center 23
Figure 9. Interactions of flows 
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E. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
 
1. Benefit Incidence of Financing 
 
Most of the resources that finance the health sector come from “ordinary resources” from the 
tax system. Of the total collected taxes, 44 percent comes from income tax (6.7 percent of 
GDP) and another 48 percent (7.4 percent of GDP) from the Value Added Tax. This tax 
structure, with a small tendency to be regressive, pays human resources payrolls, which in fact 
represent 70 percent of the cost structure in a public service that serves the poor. But taxes are 
not the only source of financing for human resources. As indicated above, according to Peru’s 
National Health Accounts,13 out of pocket financing represents 40 percent of the resources, 
and these payments for medical consultations cover the lack of ordinary resources to complete 
the needed resources for staff salary and non-salary rewards. Part of this structure is due to the 
absence of a comprehensive risk protection system—the indicator of financial protection 
(insurance to cover catastrophic health costs) is low in Peru. Table 1 compiles information on 
budget accounts located in Lima. Collected resources or fees can represent up to 17 percent of 
total resources. 
 
Table 1: Structure of financing sources according to SIAF (2007) 
 
 
  Resources by source of financing (millions of soles) 
Participation by source of 
financing (%) 
  Ordinary resources 
Collected 
resources 
Grants and 
transfers 
Ordinary 
resources 
Collected 
resources 
Grants and 
transfers 
SIS 289,7 3 27,8 90% 1% 9% 
Institutes 241,9 48,9 16 79% 16% 5% 
Health Directorates  145 23,8 13,7 79% 13% 8% 
Health Networks 158,4 13,3 6,5 89% 7% 4% 
Hospitals 769,1 163,9 36,6 79% 17% 4% 
Central Administration 
MINSA 545,2 85,9 36,2 82% 13% 5% 
Total MINSA 1,928.8 268,1 122,3 83% 12% 5% 
Participation of MINSA's 
Expenditure Units in overall 
MINSA expenditure (%) 
28% 32% 30%       
 
Technical Note: MINSA Central Administration includes PARSALUD. Health Institutes include: National 
Institute of Mental Health, National Institute of Neurological Sciences, National Institute of Ophthalmology, 
National Institute of Rehabilitation, National Institute of Child Health, National Institute of Mothers’ Health. 
Hospitals include: Daniel Alcides Carrion, San José, Hipolito Unanue, Herminilio Valdizan, Huacho-Huaura-
Oyo, Sergio Bernales, Cayetano Heredia, de Apoyo Rezola, María Auxiliadora, Arzobispo Loayza, Dos de 
Mayo, Santa Rosa, Casimiro Ulloa, Larco Herrera, Docente Madre-Niño, San Bartolome, Puente Piedra, 
Barranca-Cajatambo, Chancay, Huaral, José Agurto Tello de Chosica, San Juan de Lurigancho, Vitarte. 
 
 
Most of the users of the public sector—Ministry of Health—are quintiles 2 and 1: those living 
in poverty and extreme poverty. Some of them qualify for the public insurer SIS prioritized 
plan, others do not because of gender, age or sickness or temporary poverty. The people who 
                                                 
13 The last National Health Accounts were prepared in 2006. 
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are not covered by SIS have to pay a fee which reduces the availability of family funds for 
food and other needed services.  
 
Figure 10. Health care delivery place for the poor and extremely poor 
2006 in Metropolitan Lima 
 
Extremely Poor Poor 
 
52%
40%
8%
Health Center MINSA Pharmacy Private doctor´s office
32%
18% 18%
12%
8% 7%
3% 1% 1%
Ph
ar
m
ac
y
H
ea
lt
h 
Po
st
 M
IN
SA
H
ea
lt
h 
Ce
nt
er
 M
IN
SA
H
os
pi
ta
l M
IN
SA
H
os
pi
ta
l E
SS
AL
U
D
Pr
iv
at
e 
cl
in
ic
Pr
iv
at
e 
do
ct
or
´s
 o
ffi
ce
So
ci
al
 s
ec
ur
it
y
fa
ci
lit
ie
s
O
th
er
s
Technical notes:  
”Health Center MINSA” does not include Hospitals. 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, 2006 National Household Survey. 
Elaborated by CIUP. 
 
 
According to information from the 2006 National Household Survey, the extremely poor in 
Metropolitan Lima seek healthcare from the public sector or go directly to a pharmacy (52 
percent and 49 percent respectively). The poor first go to a pharmacy and then to a public 
facility (48 percent) (see Figure 10). Information for the non-poor appears in Annex 6.  
 
 
Figure 11. Population  who fully paid consultation fees or drugs costs 
in Metropolitan Lima (percentage) 
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Source: National Household Survey 
Elaborated: CIUP 
 
The incidence of out-of-pocket payments on the economy of the poor is evident, even in 
Metropolitan Lima. The National Household Survey reports that 76 percent  and 60 percent of 
the extremely poor and poor respectively affirmed that they paid all the fee costs of 
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consultations in ML14 (Figure 11). The same pattern is repeated for drugs. This situation 
reflects the undercoverage and lack of risk protection through health insurance. Likewise, 
public subsidies still have leakages, especially in urban hospitals in Lima. This may explain 
the public subsidies received by the non-poor (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12. Sources of health financing: subsidies and out of pocket by 
level of income in Metropolitan Lima 
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The public sector subsidizes health services which benefits all income brackets in ML; the 
latter clearly reflect the leakages in the system.  However, more critical is the share of the out-
of-pocket payment of the extremely poor and poor.  Calculations made by the National 
Institute of Statistics, out of the total costs of health, the extremely poor paid 28 percent of the 
total costs, while the poor paid 58 percent of the total costs.  All the above information 
provides enough evidence to stress that financing the sector through fees accentuates the 
inequities in the financing of the system.  
 
  
Technical notes: 
Figures 11: Anwer to the question How did you pay? 
 Figure 12: In the Summary Module of the National Household Survey, the National Institute of Statistics has 
calculated the finance structure of each individual depending on income bracket. The answer options are: i) cash out 
of pocket;   ii) self consumption; iii) in-kind payment; iv) public donations (subsidy); vi) private donations, vii) 
others, options ii), iii) and vi) were the most significant.  
Elaborated by CIUP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 For those who actually seek medical consultations.  However, 74 percent of the extremely poor that did not 
seek treatment was due to lack of resources. 
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Box 1. Characteristics of Metropolitan Lima (ML) 
 
Metropolitan Lima is an urban conglomerate made up of two provinces Lima and Callao. ML 
has a population of approximately 8.5 million people (51.1 % women and 48.9 % men). The 
age distribution is from 0-14 years old (25.2 %), 15-64 years old (68.1%), 65 years old and 
more (6.7 %). 
  
In 2007, 18.5% of the population in ML is considered poor and a 0.5% extremely poor. In 
national terms, over 13.6% of the country's poverty is concentrated in Metropolitan Lima 
(about 1.5 million people).  
  
About 42.3% of the population in Metropolitan Lima has some type of health insurance (3.6 
million people); within this group, 28% is between 0-14 years old; notwithstanding, 57.7% of 
the population is still unprotected. 
  
Lima contributes 48% of the national GDP, thus reflecting this region's weight nationwide. It 
concentrates a broad range of economic activities from manufacturing through commerce, 
financial and other services, to tourism and agriculture. 
 
 
 
 
2. Human Resources and Salaries 
 
In the health sector, the budget structure is highly concentrated in payments for human 
resources.  It can be unbundled into several types of contracts classified according to tenure 
and source of financing (ordinary resources and own source revenues from fee collection and 
SIS reimbursement).15  
 
Types of contracts 
 
1. Nombrados, part of the permanent civil service, paid with ordinary resources (taxes) 
regulated by Decree Law No. 276.16 There are also other specific laws and mandates for 
doctors (Decree Law No. 559), nurses (Law No. 27669), midwives (Law No. 27853), 
odontologists (Law No. 27878), and medical technicians (Law No. 28456). There can 
only be a new nombramiento if there is a vacancy open and it is included in the budget, 
but this nombramiento has to fit the requirements of the General Law of the National 
Budget System applied to the Expenditure Unit to which the facility belongs. People with 
this type of contract have other bonuses and special treatment in comparison with the 
other categories of human resources. More detail on bonuses can be found in Box 2. 
 
2. Contratados have long-term contracts with a maximum length of three years paid for by 
ordinary resources and regulated by Decree Law No. 276 and Law No. 24041 which 
recognize job security for this type of contract. If a contract is not renewed, the individual 
can sue the government for his/her reinstatement. 
 
                                                 
15 An excellent systematization of human resources issues can be found in Jaramillo et al.. (2006), a report 
prepared for the PARSALUD project.  Concerns regarding salaries expressed by the report coincide with the 
findings in this study. 
16 Legislative Decree No. 276, Law on the Terms and Conditions for Administrative Careers in the Public Sector 
(Ley de base de la carrera administrativa del sector público). 
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3. Non-personal services, a type of short-term contract related to products or specific 
services paid for (in theory) by:  
 
o Public Treasury funds. 
o The facilities’ own source revenues  
o SIS revenues: contracts from the Integral Health Insurance (SIS). 
o Local government funds 
o Ordinary resources channeled through PAAG: contracts from the Programa de 
Administración de Acuerdos de Gestión for targeted facilities, with less benefits than the 
above contracts 
o SISMED resources collected from the sale of pharmacy stock: used primarily to replace 
drugs but also can be used to hire and pay personnel to perform duties related to this 
function. 
 
In this kind of contract there is no formal relationship between the employer and the employee 
and thus those employed do not receive vacations, job security or rights such as the maximum 
working hours. However, in practice they sometimes have the same duties as nombrados. 
 
4. SERUMS Professionals, are health professionals who work for Rural and Marginal Urban 
Services. This is one channel for young professionals to begin a career in the Public 
Sector system. 
 
 
 
Box 2. Structure of personnel in the sample 
 
The structure of human resources by types of contracts and professional groups in the sample 
indicates that the majority are hired under the first type of contract which means that they are 
primarily paid with ordinary resources. 
 
 
Table 2: Human Resources by types of contracts and professional groups 
 
 
Nombrados Contratados Total Professional Groups 
Nº % Nº % Nº % 
Professionals (doctors, nurses, and midwives) 123 81% 28 19% 151 100% 
Other Professional Groups (odontologists, 
psychologists, etc.) 35 60% 23 40% 58 100% 
Health Technicians 122 69% 56 31% 178 100% 
Administrative Technicians 81 63% 47 37% 128 100% 
SERUMS Professionals      57 100% 
PAAG contract holders     3 100% 
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Complementing the financing of  the personnel budget with fees  
 
The resources collected are registered as part of the the balance of each facility and all the 
monies collected by a facility have to be deposited on daily basis in a bank account17 
designated by the Health Network. The Health Network returns a portion of the deposited 
amount as petty cash for each facility (according to the survey, this amounts, on average, to 
12.3 per cent of monies deposited). The rest of the deposited amount is earmarked for goods 
and services and for human resources benefits.  The part corresponding to human resources 
(38 percent) and is redistributed to the facilities according to the number and type of 
personnel contracts and the bonuses to which they have become entitled on the basis of 
agreements and pacts; most of these are the result of negotiations between the unions and the 
central administration at MINSA.  
 
Each Health Network negotiates with the central administration regarding the percentage of 
bonuses that will be financed by the central government financing and the percentage to be 
financed from own collected resources. Since there is no one rule for all the Health Networks, 
the management skills of each Health Network are of great importance (see Box 3 for a 
sample case). 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3. Personnel bonuses 
 
Health Networks are responsible for cash management in order to pay the extra monies workers have become 
entitled to as a result of negotiations for salary improvements. Currently they are entitled to the following 
payments per month:  
 
Productivity  
(also known as the special assignment by labor 
assistance or AETA): 
 
30 soles (AETA) x 22 days = 660  
 
Lunch:                         7 soles x 22 days  = 158 
Food basket:                                        = 300 
TOTAL IN SOLES    1,118 
 
In some cases, bonuses were initially paid from collected resources but later managers were able to cover this 
additional cost from ordinary resources, such as the case of the sample in the study. The management skills of 
the executive unit (Health Directorate or Health Network) are critical in obtaining ordinary resources to cover 
these payments. 
 
Note that the Chorillos-Barranco-Surco Health Network and the decentralized Arequipa Network have "work 
shift" and Social Welfare Subvention-CAFAE as regular extra income financed mainly by ordinary resources. In 
addition, ordinary resources are the only source for financing expenditures on  "Education and Christmas and 
other bonuses." For details, see the following chart: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 All resources generated in the health public sector are deposited in the Banco de la Nacion (BN), a state- 
owned bank. 
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Expenditure Resources(S/.) 
Expenditure 
classification Months Source 
I. Chorillos-Barranco-Surco Health Network 
Education/Christmas bonuses/other bonuses 361,933 Human resources  Feb/Jul/Dec OR 
Education/Christmas bonuses/other bonuses 1,500 Pensions, fringe benefits Feb/Jul/Dec OR 
Work shifts (guardias) 838,857 Human resources  12 OR 
Social Welfare Subvention-CAFAE 1,014,640 Human resources  12 OR (91%)-CR (9%) 
  
II. South Lima Health Directorate  
Education/Christmas bonuses/other bonuses 79,867 Human resources  Feb/Jul/Dec OR 
Education/Christmas bonuses/other bonuses 613,265 Pensions, fringe benefits 6 months OR 
Social Welfare Subvention-CAFAE 1,977,193 Human resources  12 OR 
  
III. Arequipa Health Directorate 
Education/Christmas bonuses/other bonuses 165,864 Human resources  Feb/Jul/Dec OR 
Education/Christmas bonuses/other bonuses 425,393 Pensions, fringe benefits Feb/Jul/Dec OR 
Night shifts 122,932 Human resources  12 OR 
Social Welfare Subvention-CAFAE 2,035,597 Human resources  12 OR (97%)-CR (3%) 
OR: Ordinary resources / CR: Collected resources 
 
*All professionals (doctors, nurses, midwives, technicians, etc.) receive equal amounts of AETA (30 soles); the 
variation is on the number of AETAs that are recognized. In the Region of Lima, doctors receive up to 22 
AETAs per month; in other regions, they receive up to 9 AETAs per month. In the case of nurses in regions 
other than Lima, the central government assures the transfer of resources to finance at least 4 AETAs per month. 
 
The Health Network under study offers an “improved basket” from its own collected resources (fees): 
 
School expenses, soles 250 
Mother’s Day Bonus, soles 150 
Father’s Day Bonus, soles 150 
Independence Day Bonus, soles 500 
Christmas Bonus, soles 652.5 
  
*All workers. 
* Non-personal services do not receive a “productivity bonus” nor an incentive via an “improved basket” 
(canasta mejorada). This personnel may receive a financial incentive at Christmas but this is not guaranteed due 
to a lack of resources in the sector.  
 
Sources: Interviews with  Health Network staff and Jaramillo et al. 2006.  
 
Considering the sources of health financing in Metropolitan Lima, the non-insured poor and 
the extremely poor end up paying for personnel bonuses not covered by ordinary resources. 
Moreover, the bonuses do not correspond to any established merit system as will be discussed 
below.   
 
Single fund collection and cross-subsidizing between facilities  
 
Money collected from fees from all facilities in a Health Network are put into a single fund at 
the Network. This fund is used to pay human resources (including bonus payments) and to 
purchase goods, services, and other minor capital expenditures (see Table 3). This model 
assumes that the more active facilities with higher collections will contribute more resources 
to the joint fund. No explicit formula exists for the redistribution of funds among facilities. 
Despite the fact that this sometimes leads to discontent, this distribution is generally accepted 
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and the facilities that receive less (even though they contribute more) maintain the status quo 
because this allows them to keep at least part of the money for their personnel.  
 
 
Health staff confronted with the wrong incentives: salaries competing against goods and 
services for the facilities 
 
As explained above, only a percentage of own collected resources are returned to facilities as 
petty cash to purchase small goods in the case of emergencies. However, an observational 
analysis during visits to the facilities immediately revealed the facilities lacked many goods. 
The question arises as to why personnel do not protest in order to recover the rest of the funds 
collected that currently remain at the Network. Moreover, why don’t they ask to receive 
money from fees in accordance with performance? The answer apparently lies in the existence 
of the wrong incentives: the salaries of professionals and technicians compete against the 
goods and services that the facilities need.  
 
 
Figure 14: Relationship between average collected resources and the level of stockout 
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It would be expected that those facilities that contribute more to the single fund receive more 
support from the Health Network in terms of goods. However, there is no clear relationship 
between the weight of petty cash in relation to collected resources and the number of main 
goods that presented stockout. 
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Table 3. South Lima Health Directorate: sources of funds and expenditures, 2007 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SIAF. 
South Lima Health Directorate  
19 million soles 
Ordinary 
Sources 
 (80%) 
Collected 
Sources (13%)
Budgetary 
Grants and 
Transfers (7%)
1.3 Million soles15.2 Million soles 2.4 Million soles
Good and 
services
5.2 MLN 
(28%) 
Human resources 
and employee 
benefits 
4.2 MLN (22%) 
 
Pensions, fringe
benefits 
9.3 MLN 
(49%)
 0 soles   
 (0%) 
4.2 Million (28%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Social Welfare Subvention 
(47%): 1.97 MLN 
- Complementary payments –
Administrative Civil Service 
Law (23%): 0.98 MLN 
- Extraordinary allocation for 
social services (servicios 
asistenciales) (20%): 0.85 MLN 
 
0 soles  
(0%) 
1.4  Million (10%) 
Main elements: 
  
- Non-Personal Services 
(37%): 0.5 MLN 
- Third party services 
(13%): 0.2 mill 
- Telephone, water & 
electricity services 
(12%): 0.17 MLN 
2.4 Million (99%) 
Main elements: 
  
- Medicine (70%): 1.7 
MLN 
- Non-personnel Services 
(13%): 0.307 mill 
- Consumer goods (11%): 
0.258 MLN  
 
1.3 Million (99.6%) 
Main elements: 
  
- Medicine (87%): 1.1 mill 
- Consumer goods (11%): 
0.1 MLN 
9.3 Million (61%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Retirement pension (91%): 
8.5 MLN 
- Schools, rewards (7%): 0.6 
MLN 
0 soles 
 (0%) 
 
0 soles   
(0%) 
 
Investments 
0.1 MLN (1%) 
0.1 Million (1%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Equipment and durable 
goods (73%): 101 MLN 
- Consultancy services 
(13%): 18 MLN 
 
 
Universidad del Pacifico Research Center 33
 
Table 4. Barranco-Chorrillos-Surco Health Network: sources and expenditure, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ordinary Sources 
 (90%) 
 
Collected Sources  
(7%) 
 
 Budgetary Grants 
and Transfers (3%)
 
 20.2 Million soles 1.6 Million soles  0.7 Million soles 
 
 16.8 Million (83%) 
Main elements: 
- Extraordinary allocation for 
welfare services (36%): 6.1 
MLN 
- Complementary payments 
–Medical civil service 
(30%): 5 MLN 
- Complementary payments - 
- Administrative Civil 
service. (16%): 2.7 MLN 
- Social Welfare Subvention 
(6%): 0.943 MLN  
- Hospital shifts (5%): 0.8 
MLN 
 
 
0.6 Million (38%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Extraordinary 
allocation for social 
services (servicios 
asistenciales) (89%): 
0.56 MLN 
- Social Welfare 
Subvention (11%): 71 
mil soles. 
 
 0 soles 
 (0%) 
 
 2.5 Million (13%) 
Main elements: 
  
- Non-Personal Services 
(46%): 1.1 MLN 
- Third party services (15%): 
0.4 MLN 
- Consumer goods (13%): 
0.33 MLN  
- Telephone, water & 
electricity service (10%): 
0.25 MLN                    
 
 0.84 Million (51%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Travel expenses and 
per diem allowances 
(25%): 0.2 MLN  
- Third party services 
(18%): 0.15 MLN 
- Consumers goods 
(16%): 0.13 MLN 
- Clothes (12%): 0.1 
MLN 
 
 
 0.56 Million (79%) 
Main elements: 
  
- Non-Personal 
Services (41%): 0.23 
MLN 
- Third party services 
(22%): 0.12 MLN 
 
 
 
 
0.7 Million (4%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Equipment and durable 
goods (100%): 0.7 MLN 
 
 
 
0.1 Million (11%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Equipment and durable 
goods (100%): 0.7 MLN 
 
 0.14 Million (21%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Equipment and 
durable goods (100%): 
0.14 MLN 
 
 
Source: SIAF. 
 
Barranco-Chorrillos-Surco 
22.6 million soles de soles 
Other capital 
expenditure 
 
Good and
services 
3.9 Mill. (18%) 
 
Human 
resources and
employee:  
17 Mill. 
 
 
Universidad del Pacifico Research Center 34
 
Table 5: Arequipa Health Directorate: sources and expenditures, 2007 
 
 Ordinary Sources 
(88%) 
 
Collected Sources 
(10%) 
 Budgetary Grants 
and Transfers (2%) 
 32.3 Million soles 
 
3.8 Million soles 
 
 0.7 Million soles 
 
 
 7.7 Million (24%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Retirement pension (89%): 
6.8  MLN 
- Schools, rewards (6%): 0.4 
mill 
 
 
86 thousand soles 
(2%) 
 0 soles 
(0%) 
 
 
 0.9 Million (3%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Third party services (19%): 
0.17 mill 
- Non-Personal Services 
(17%): 0.15 MLN 
- Telephone, water & 
electricity service (11%): 0.1 
MLN 
 
3.6 Million (96%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Medicine (73%): 2.6 
MLN 
- Consumer goods 
(13%): 0.46 MLN 
- Non-Personal Services 
(7%): 0.26 mill 
 
 
 0.3 Million (31%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Medicine (87%): 1.1 
mill 
- Third party services 
(11%): 0.1 MLN 
 
 
 
7.4 Million (23%) 
Main elements: 
 
- Social Welfare Subvention 
(26%): 1.97 MLN 
- Long term contract –public 
and private. (19%): 1.3 MLN
- Complementary payments - 
- Administrative Civil 
Service Law (19%): 1.3 
MLN 
- Extraordinary allocation for 
social services (servicios 
asistenciales) (17%): 1.2  
MLN 
 
 
 
 0 soles 
(0%) 
 
 
 7.7 Million (24%) 
Main elements: 
- Equipment and durable goods 
(100%): 7.7 MLN. 
 
  0 soles    
  (0%) 
 
     
 8.6 Million (26%) 
Main elements: 
 
  0.41 Million (69%) 
Main elements: 
 
 Social Welfare Subvention - 
Consultancy services (99%): 8.5 
MLN 
  - Social Welfare Subvention 
- Consultancy services 
(100%): 0.41 MLN 
 
 Source: SIAF 
 
   
 
 
 
Pensions, fringe 
benefits 
7.7 mill. (21%) 
Good and 
services 
4.9 mill. (13%) 
Human resources 
and employee 
benefits 
4.9 mill. (13%) 
Investments  
7.7 mill. (21%) 
Other current 
expenses  
8.9 mill. (24%) 
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A difference in collected fees leads to different incentives for personnel 
 
Besides the above issues of negative incidence on poor patients, differences in collected fees 
create an unequal distribution of funds among facilities and varying incentives regimes. What 
happens to facilities located in poorer and the poorest areas? The situation of dynamic health 
units in urban areas cannot be applied to rural areas where human resources actually should be 
paid more because of the working conditions and high risks involved.  
 
Differences in salaries, bonuses, and working conditions have led to a concentration of 
SERUMS in urban areas  (the research team found an important number of SERUMS in some 
facilities in the Health Network studied, see Table 4). In contrast, the Minister of Health has 
just announced that there are about 5 thousand vacancies for health professionals that would 
need to be covered to reach the Latin America average for the number of health 
professionals.18 
 
 
The way contracts are registered does not contribute to transparency. Payment of 
salaries and bonuses of contracted personnel are registered under  “goods and services”  
 
The absence of a merit system, a civil service career path, and budgetary fiscal control in 
hiring new long-term personnel have created an incentive to hire, pay, and register part of the 
salaries and benefits of human resources under “goods and services.” Some of the contracts 
are registered as services while some in-kind bonuses are registered as goods, all of which 
leads to diminished transparency.  
 
These practices are supported by the legal framework at the level of the Regional Directorates 
and at the level of the Health Networks (see tables 3 and 4). However, recently the central 
government promulgated Legislative Decree No. 1057 whose purpose is to regulate what are 
classified as “non-personal services” in public administration19.  
 
The public information available on Health Care Sector expenditures makes it difficult to 
estimate total expenditures related to human resources since these expenditures are included 
in the budget lines not only as “personnel” but also as “goods and services.” This does not 
facilitate transparency.  
 
Note that Tables 3 and 4 provide information on “goods and services” accounts of non-
personal services and third party services, paid with ordinary and collected resources. Table 4 
provides information on the Health Network studied: 61% of the resources from goods and 
services were used for the payment for human resources with contracts initiated with ordinary 
resources. 
 
An additional issue arises because not all personnel receive bonuses, which are provided only 
to staff that are part of the civil service or have long-term contracts. 
 
                                                 
18 Speech of the Minister of Health during a working lunch with the American Chamber of Commerce, Lima, 
May 17, 2008. 
19 Legislative Decree No. 1057 which regulates the special scheme for the recruitment of Administrative 
Services. The DL recognizes the status of Non Personal Services workers; these workers will be enrolled in 
Social Security to have health benefits and it will establish a cap of 48 hours per week of work. 
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Information from interviews was triangulated with information from budget records in SIAF.  
The example presented in Table 4 shows that this particular Health Network allocates 38 
percent of collected fees and 42 percent of ordinary resources to pay for staff bonuses under 
the line item “human resources.” It is important to note that the amount financed with 
ordinary resources is almost twelve times the amount financed with collected fees. 
 
In the case of other EUs outside of Lima, the situation is quite different. Table 5 describes the  
case of the Region of Arequipa: first, the Health Directorate in Arequipa allocates 7% of 
collected fees to pay for contracted personnel under services accounts (less than the South 
Lima Health Directorate). In addition, the Health Directorate in Arequipa uses about 2 percent 
of collected resources to pay pensions and fringe benefits though this item is generally 
financed with ordinary resources.  
 
 
3. Goods and Services 
 
Delays in the distribution of goods, including office supply and cleaning products 
 
Facilities are not expenditure units so the Health Network has to purchase the goods and 
contract services for the facilities.20 
 
Delays and cuts in requests for goods and services are common occurences (see Table 6). In 
addition, sometimes unneeded goods are received. At least one anecdotal case was repeated in 
the Health Network and facilities: they received red wax for floors, a type of wax  
recommended for wooden floors or red tiles, but most of the facilities have rustic or cement 
floors.  
 
Table 6: Average shortage of most used goods in facilities 
 
Good Number of 
facilities 
Average 
shortage period 
(days) 
Maximum 
shortage period 
(days) 
Minimum 
shortage period 
(days) 
Bleach  7 (50%) 88 180 7 
Gloves  4 (29%) 70 99 30 
Cotton  3 (21%) 52 90 7 
Office supplies 2 (14%) 75 90 60 
Alcohol  2 (14%) 9 10 7 
Gauze 2 (14%) 34 60 7 
Tongue depressors 2 (14%) 30 30 30 
Disinfectant 2 (14%) 49 90 7 
 
Health Networks also pay for utilities, including telephone service. In the Health Network 
studied, no important incident of non-payment has occurred. 
 
 
Shortage of five main goods 
 
In the survey, facilities listed their five most-used goods and indicated whether shortages of 
any of these had occurred in the preceding twelve months. The results indicate that almost all 
                                                 
20 In situations where procurement takes more time than anticipated, facilities lend  each other goods. 
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facilities had at least one input stockout. There is no pattern to stockouts within facilities but 
facility level C I-3 had more goods in stockout.  
 
Figure 15: Number of five main goods in short supply 
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Difficulties in the provision of drugs  
 
The provision of drugs is organized under a system called SISMED (Integrated System of 
Pharmaceutical Provisions and Supplies) which involves different units within the Ministry of 
Health, Health Directorates, Health Networks, and facilities. SISMED sets the rules and 
responsibilities of each type of unit according to seven steps: selection, programming, 
procurement, storage, distribution, use, and reporting. 
 
Difficulties can be found at every step of the process but this study focuses on four: 
programming, procurement, storage, and distribution. For more detailed information on the 
entire process of provision of pharmaceuticals see Annex 5. 
 
 
Programming at the national level is affected by delays on the level of intermediate units: 
Health Directorates and Health Networks.  
 
Difficulties throughout the whole process of procurement of pharmaceuticals cause scarcity in 
facilities. 
• DIGEMID is the central unit of the Ministry of Health in charge of consolidating 
purchase requests from all the Health Directorates and advising them on these matters. 
Programming the needed level of inputs can take several weeks. Final purchases are 
carried out by the procurement unit of the Ministry of Health. 
 
• Health Directorates are responsible for the purchase of “support” pharmaceuticals 
(medicamentos de soporte). The lack of capacities in programming at the facilities and 
at the Health Directorates themselves is one of the reasons for delays in the purchase 
and delivery of pharmaceutical inputs.  
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Table 7: Average shortage period of most-used drugs in facilities 
 
Drugs Number of 
facilities 
Average 
shortage period 
(days) 
Maximum 
shortage period 
(days) 
Minimum 
shortage period 
(days) 
Amoxicillin 500ml  5 (36%) 42 60 30 
Amoxicillin  4 (29%) 60 90 30 
Dicloxacillin 500ml  3 (21%) 50 60 30 
Parecetamol 500 ml tablet  2 (14%) 45 60 30 
Ibuprofen 400 ml Tab  2 (14%) 45 45 45 
Amoxicillin 250 ml 2 (14%) 37.5 45 30 
 
 
Another way to illustrate the same problem is through the level of drugs in understock. 
According to SISMED’s Availability of drugs indicator, there is a state of critical availability 
when the drugs in stock cover demand for less than one month.21 Within the sample, the 
facilities that have the largest proportion of drugs in critical availability are C I-3 facilities 
(see Figure 16). In addition, facilities listed their five most-in-demand drugs and whether any 
of them have presented shortages during the last twelve months. Facilities level C I-3 
presented the most drugs in stockout.  
 
 
Figure 16: Number of five principal drugs in short supply and percentage of drugs in 
understock 
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21 Considering the average monthly consumption of drugs. 
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Poor coordination among operations, finance, and pharmaceutical departments inside 
the Health Directorates has caused procurement processes to fail22 
 
In the SISMED system, there are regulations regarding the use of pharmaceutical fee 
collections:  
 
80% of the operation price is to be earmarked to 
cover expenses for future procurement of drugs 
and medical inputs. The Health Directorate is 
responsible for guaranteeing that facilities receive 
adequate pharmaceutical supplies.  
 
10% of the operation price is to be earmarked to 
cover the expenses of the facilities according to 
SISMED regulations, i.e., personnel. 
The entire pharmaceutical fee collection 
is sent to facilities’ SISMED Revolving 
Fund (DISA). The pharmaceutical fee is 
called the “operation price.”23 
 
 
A maximum of 20% of the 
pharmaceutical fee collected can be 
used to cover the specific operational 
expenses of facilities and the Health 
Directorate. 
The remaining 10% is to be earmarked to cover the 
expenses of the Health Directorate according to 
SISMED expenses items. 
 
 
So far, the regulations seem clear; however, there are some situations that occur in the Health 
Directorates that can affect the stock availability of drugs.  
• The Finance Department may not have informed the Pharmaceutical Department of the 
total budget available. The Pharmaceutical Department, in turn, may not have adequately 
forecast the required level of inputs. .  
• There is a lack of knowledge regarding the standardized rule: 80% for the procurement 
process and 20% for administrative expenses. This can have two effects:  
 
i) Purchase requests sent to the Procurement Unit of the Health Directorate may not 
specify the exact amounts needed. According to SISMED estimates, almost half of the 
Health Directorates assigned less than the 80% (standard rule) of the total collected in 
pharmaceutical sales and SIS reimbursements to the next procurement process. 
 
ii) Delays in the emission of purchase orders and of payments to providers. 
 
 
Difficulties in pharmaceutical programming by the National Health Strategy for 
Tuberculosis Prevention and Control 
 
There are many problems and delays in the programming process of the National Health 
Strategy for Tuberculosis Prevention and Control,. Many facilities do not program all the 
drugs and medical inputs required by the Strategy (see Annex 7). 
 
Opportunity for precocious diagnoses are lost when there is an insufficient supply of spit 
glasses or pharmaceutical goods. This leads to sources of contagion being preserved 
                                                 
22 In addition, interviews with DIGEMID staff revealed problems in accurate programming on the part of  the 
facilities. 
23 The operation price is the price the pharmacy charges users for drugs or other medical inputs. The operation 
price is the sum of the acquisition price and operative expenses. Operative expenses are calculated as 25% of the 
acquisition price.  
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unknowingly or inadequately treated. As a result, the health of workers at facilities and the 
public at large is put at risk.  
 
Delays in the arrival of drugs required by the National Health Strategy for Tuberculosis 
Prevention and Control reduce efficacy 
 
The National Health Strategy for Tuberculosis Prevention and Control includes two plans 
(Primary and MDR). Their implementation reveals problems at the lowest level of the Health 
System. For example, according to the Health Network studied, the facilities have previous 
knowledge of the pick-up dates; however, a significant percentage (42% for the Primary Plan 
and 58% for MDR) of the facilities report that they were not informed of these dates. In the 
case of delays and shortages, the same contradictory information issues exist.24 This study 
identifies this problem as a bottleneck in this Strategy. It should be noted that in the case of 
MDR treatment, delays in the delivery of pharmaceuticals were so common that even the 
Health Network had to admit they existed.   
 
Table 8: Triangulation of responses from the Health Network and the facilities 
regarding pharmaceutical deliveries for the National Health Strategy for Tuberculosis 
Prevention and Control 
 
Health Network’s 
responses 
Facilities’ responses  
 
Questions Primary 
Plan 
MDR  Primary 
Plan 
MDR 
Yes Yes Yes  7 (58%) 5 (42%) Did the facilities have previous 
knowledge of pick-up dates?   No  5 (42%) 7 (58%) 
 Yes Yes  4 (33%) 8 (67%) Was there a delay in the arrival 
of drugs during the last 12 
months? No  No  8 (67%) 4 (33%) 
 Yes Yes  8 (67%) 7 (58%) Was there a shortage of 
tuberculosis  drugs during the 
last 12 months? No  No  4 (33%) 5 (42%) 
 
Delays in the arrival of vaccines and medical inputs required for the Vaccination 
Program reduce efficacy 
 
In contrast to the information provided regarding the National Health Strategy for 
Tuberculosis Prevention and Control, in the case of the Vaccination Program, both the Health 
Network and 7 of 14 facilities reported that there was at least one delay in the arrival of 
vaccines during the previous twelve months.  
 
Still, while the Health Network asserted that facilities have information in advance about 
pick-up dates for vaccines and medical inputs (needles, syringes, etc.), survey results indicate 
that a number of facilities were not aware of the pick-up dates for vaccines and medical inputs 
required for the program. Regardless of who is right and who is wrong, there is obviously a 
communication problem.  
 
The survey also found that the role of micro-networks in facilitating the flow of information is 
unclear: 
                                                 
24 The findings of this study include sections where the results from the facilities survey are contrasted with the 
results from the Health Network survey. 
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“I have to keep calling the Health Network myself several times to see if the drugs have 
arrived yet because the Micro-Network does not notify us” (notes from survey administered to 
a pharmacist). 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Triangulation of responses from the Health Network and the facilities 
regarding pharmaceutical deliveries for the Vaccination Program 
 
 Health Network’s responses Facilities’ responses 
 
Questions 
 
Vaccines 
Needles,  
 syringes, and 
other inputs 
  
Vaccines 
Needles,  
 syringes, and 
other inputs 
Yes Yes Yes  11 (79%) 10 (71%) Did the Facilities 
have previous 
knowledge of the 
pick-up date? 
  No  3 (21%) 4 (29%) 
Yes  Yes  7 (50%) 4 (29%) Was there a delay in 
the arrival of drugs 
during the last 12 
months?  No No  7 (50%) 10 (71%) 
 
Because of the importance of the Vaccination Program, SISMED’s indicators valuation 
methodology requires a standard of zero delays. This is far from having been achieved, even 
in Metropolitan Lima.  
 
4. Influence of SIS management  
 
Delays in SIS reimbursements to facilities (through the Health Directorate or the Health 
Network) for pharmaceuticals also causes delays in purchases as well as shortage.  
 
The main sources of financing for SISMED are the own collected resources of the facilities, 
SIS reimbursements, and the Public Treasury through ordinary resources. With the increase in 
SIS coverage as a result of a national policy to increase coverage, the system needs more free 
drugs for insured patients and, since reimbursement can take two months, there is a delay in 
receiving funds to buy more drugs. Since SISMED funds should be financed completly to 
proceed with purchases, the delay in SIS reimbursements also affects the provision of 
medication required for uninsured patients.  
 
 
Threre are delays in SIS reimbursements for drugs from the Health Network to the 
Health Directorate  
 
There are two kinds of reimbursement processes: one from SIS to the Health Directorate and 
the other, from SIS to the Health Network. In the latter case, the Health Network sends 
reimbursements for drugs to the Health Directorate because Health Networks are not allowed 
to buy drugs.  
 
There are two administrative directives that regulate the reimbursement process:  
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• Fund transfers from Health Networks Executing Units to Health Directorates and 
Regional Health Directorates, R.M. No, 887-2007/MINSA 
• The payment process for SIS consultations and reimbursement for drugs delivered to 
SIS beneficiaries, R.M. No. 422-2007/MINSA 
 
However, the supervisions of the Health Directorates that are regularly carried out by 
DIGEMID indicate that some Health Networks take more time to send reimbursements than 
others. In the case of the Loreto Health Directorate, for example, one of its Health Networks 
has not sent reimbursements for drugs for a total of 435,000 soles. Furthermore, there is one 
case in which the Health Network sent medication reimbursements after a year.25 
 
Such delays lead to the underfinancing of the SISMED fund and this is aggravated as a result 
of increases in SIS consumption due to the expansion of insurance coverage.  
 
Non-insured patients and facilities bear the cost of understocks in pharmacies due to 
distortions caused by SIS rules 
 
Facilities employ two strategies to cope with the lack of sufficient stock in pharmacies. In 
order to retain SIS financing, they cut down on supplies for prescriptions for uninsured 
patients, favoring SIS patients and participants in the National Health Strategies. Services 
provided to insured patients who are not given medications in accordance with established 
protocols results in the rejection of claims by the insurer (see the following section on 
management). In addition, pharmacists not only spend a good deal of time coordinating with 
the Health Micro-Network but they also have to coordinate with other facilities to borrow 
what they need. The latter practice is not sanctioned by existing regulations but is an 
intelligent response to the problems faced.  
 
Table 10: Restrictions on sales of drugs  
in order to protect stock for SIS patients 
 
In the last twelve months, did the facility 
restrict the sale of drugs to protect the 
stock of drugs for SIS patients? 
Number/percent of 
facilities 
Yes, one time. 3 (21.43%) 
Yes, twice or more times 8 (57.14%) 
No, there was no need 3 (21.43%) 
 
Even though facilities try to guarantee stocks of drugs for insured patients, pharmaceutical 
delays can cause understocks in pharmacies which results in the provision of inadequate 
services and, consequently, a loss of reimbursements. The facilities and the Health 
Directorates then have to cover this loss with part of their own collected resources. 
 
A vicious circle is created: delays in reimbursement lead to understocks of drugs and the lack 
of drugs causes the rejection of requests for reimbursement. 
                                                 
25 Information from an interview with a DIGEMID staff member. 
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5. Management, Petty Cash and Insurance Reimbursement 
 
Head Doctors’ heterogeneous perceptions of autonomy  
 
The Health Networks and Health Directorates manage all contracts. The facilities’ Head 
Doctors have only a relative level of authority over personnel. The Head Doctor does not 
decide on schedules or the vacation calendar. Since a management-by-results scheme has not 
yet been implemented, when an emergency occurs, the Head Doctor has to obtain the 
voluntary agreement of staff or negotiate with the nombrados to work extra hours.26 If an 
administrative fault is committed, neither the Head Doctor nor the Health Network can fire 
the professional; at most they can move the person to another facility. Nonetheless, 9 out of 
14 facilities claim that they have medium autonomy in managing human resources inside their 
facility. However, during the interviews, comments made indicate a perception of a lack of 
autonomy in managing human resources because, in some facilities, the person in charge of 
human resources only controls attendance and does not manage the paperwork related to 
hiring nor does he/she know if the personnel received their salaries on time (because they are 
paid directly by the Network). 
 
Despite the fact that legislation stipulates that facilities do not purchase pharmaceuticals or 
equipment, it was surprising to find that 7 out of 14 facilities in the sample claim to have 
medium autonomy in this regard and one claims full autonomy in drug procurement. A 
similar situation occurs with equipment procurement—5 facilities claim to have medium 
autonomy and 2 say they have full autonomy. There seems to be a heterogeneous perception 
regarding managerial autonomy among the facilities which could indicate that there are 
unwritten rules (Table 11). For example, some facilities stated that they purchase equipment 
and report the purchase afterwards. Another facility said that they use petty cash “because it 
is made for spending.” Finally, another facility reported that it divided a purchase into two 
different receipts so that they would not have reporting problems since there are set limits on 
expenditures per item.  
 
Table 11: Facility managers’ perceptions of autonomy  
 
Reduced 
autonomy 
Medium 
autonomy Full autonomy Category 
Nº % Nº % Nº % 
Setting the amount of petty cash 10 71% 4 29% 0 0% 
Setting the level of fees  8 57% 5 36% 1 7% 
In-kind purchases 8 57% 5 36% 1 7% 
Equipment procurement 7 50% 5 36% 2 14% 
Pharmaceutical procurement 6 43% 7 50% 1 7% 
Quantity of goods received by the facility 5 36% 9 64% 0 0% 
Quantity of pharmaceuticals received by the 
f ilit
2 14% 12 86% 0 0% 
                                                 
26 After this report was finished, the Ministry of Health increased the number of doctors’ hours for consultations 
from four to six per day.  Before doctors worked four hours in consultations and two hours in other related 
medical tasks.  The total number of hours has not changed. 
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facility 
Human resources and schedule arrangements 
inside the facility 1 7% 9 64% 4 29% 
Use of petty cash 0 0% 9 64% 5 36% 
Use of equipment 0 0% 5 36% 9 64% 
 
Other examples of lack of authority over personnel were found. For example, workers 
contracted by PAAG, a central unit of the Ministry of Health, are assigned to Health Posts in 
low income areas. These workers are not subject to the human resources regulations of the 
Network but, rather, to PAAG/MINSA. Cases of absenteeism and ghost workers were found 
during  inspections of current central administration. Indeed, the Ministry of Health has just 
decided to transfer the responsibility for hiring and supervision to the Health Directorates in 
order to improve control. 
 
In addition, workers hired to input data by SIS, the public insurer and a budget unit separate 
from the Ministry, also are not subject to facility regulations. In fact, the facility may have its 
own personnel for data input to handle the facility’s statistics and clinical histories. 
 
 
Large administrative tasks burden in facilities C I-1 to C I-4 lead to a need for 
specialized administrative personnel  
 
As indicated in Table 12, the relationship between the administrative burden and the main 
categories of professionals (doctors, nurses, and midwives) per facility is, on average, 3 to 5 
when all health professional categories are included. According to these findings, 
administrative personnel are very important in the management of the facilities. It can be 
concluded that investment in administrative training that includes a healthcare sector 
specialization would provide an important return in terms of efficiency in the provision of 
health services. The lack of such specialization results in health professionals spending time 
on administrative tasks instead of caring for patients or engaging in other healthcare related 
tasks: seeing patients, laboratory and pharmacy work.  
 
Procurement and stocking (at least in urban settings) is so demanding that pharmacists have to 
neglect outpatient services in order to take care of logistical arrangements themselves (e.g.. 
following-up on Health Directorate deposits through repeated phone calls). The role of Health 
Micro- Network is unclear. 
 
Table 12: Ratio of administrative burden to health professionals 
 
Ratio Max Min Median 
Principal categories of 
professionals1 5:3 1:3 3.5:4 
All categories of 
professionals2 1:1 1:4 3:5 
1/ Doctors, nurses, and midwives. 
2 All health professionals 
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There is a gap between the number of personnel required by facilities and the number of 
personnel assigned 
 
One of the most frequent problems reported by facilities is the insufficient number of 
professionals. According to the facilities survey, all facilities require at least one more doctor 
and 69% require at least one more nurse; however, 38% of the facilities did not receive the 
doctors requested and 56% did not receive the nurses requested. 
 
Table 13: Comparison of the number of personnel required by facilities and the number 
assigned by professional category 
 
Requests from 
facilities for 
additional HR 
Facilities that 
received  
100% of HR 
requested 
Facilities that 
received part 
of HR  
requested 
Facilities that did 
not  receive any 
additional HR 
 
Professional 
category 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Doctors  13 100% 7 54% 1 8% 5 38% 
Nurses  9 69% 4 44% 0 0% 5 56% 
Midwives 4 31% 3 75% 0 0% 1 25% 
Odontologists  3 23% 1 33% 0 0% 2 67% 
Social workers  8 62% 3 38% 0 0% 5 63% 
Psychologists 3 23% 1 33% 0 0% 2 67% 
Other professionals or 
health technicians 8 62% 3 38% 1 13% 4 50% 
Other administrative 
professionals or 
technicians 6 46% 1 17% 3 50% 2 33% 
 
 
Supervision and lack of understanding the problem  
 
Survey results indicate that there is no clear policy on the objectives of supervision visits. 
Normally, facilities do not receive important or meaningful advice after inspections are 
carried out. Supervision does not lead to or provide solutions to detected problems. This 
statement illustrates the problem: 
 
“They [the supervisors] only check the cleaning …of course, the bathrooms are dirty at 9:30 
in the morning—the only cleaning lady we have has been cleaning the blood in the emergency 
room accumulated during the night…they [the supervisors] do not look or ask about our 
needs…only the dust” (recreated notes from survey). 
 
Another issue detected during the interviews is that, in some cases, the supervisor did not 
seem to be aware of the responsibilities of the facility because he/she made recommendations 
related to areas in which the facilities do not have any autonomy. For example, supervisors 
suggested less personnel rotation and extending the hours the facility is open. As noted above,  
it is the Health Network is responsible for such personnel matters and the facilities do not 
have the authority to directly hire or fire personnel or transfer them easily. Moreover, in two 
facilities, the person in charge of personnel stated that she/he did not know if there were 
delays in the payment of personnel because these are direct transactions between the Health 
Network and the worker. 
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In other cases, supervisors were not aware of requests made by facilities. In one case, the 
supervisor from the Health Network suggested infrastructural improvements unaware that  the 
facility already had submitted a request for such improvements to the Health Network. 
Furthermore, this is an area that lies within the responsibilities of the Health Networks. 
 
 
Administration, procurement, and storerooms can generate leakage 
 
The fact that there could be more than one channel for the receival of goods and 
pharmaceuticals in the Health Centers creates the possibility for leakages. Five out of fourteen 
facilities state that they have more than one place to store goods. According to regulations, a 
receipt document (PECOSA: Pedido de Comprobante de Salida) registers every item received 
at a facility, and in principle, one person should be responsible for doing the registration. 
There could be cases, however, in which some services within facilities receive goods directly 
from the Health Network. This promotes incomplete registration of stocks, making it difficult 
to track the final destination of goods. The administrative coordinator of one facility stated 
that: 
 
“I receive most of the items but there are two services— lab and dentistry— they coordinate 
directly with the Network and bring their supplies to the facility, but once I received a 
PECOSA with a large list and I was requested to sign… .I waited for the doctor and saw that 
he had brought a lesser quantity than registered. I did not want to sign. …Since then, I go to 
the Health Network and ask them to give the items to me...” (notes from interview). 
 
In fact, a level 3 Health Center (included in our sample) is not supposed to have 
administrative personnel in charge of goods and services and, in addition, a storeroom should 
not exist. However our observations and visits told a different story: all the facilities reported 
have a storeroom for goods. In some cases, the pharmacy takes on the responsibility for the 
PECOSAs.   
 
In response to the survey, 10 of 14 facilities reported that they have a storeroom for drugs and 
only one reported that it did not have a storeroom for vaccines. 
 
Table 14: Number of facilities with storerooms for drugs and vaccines 
 
  Answer Number of facilities 
Yes 10 (71%) Drugs No 4 (29%) 
Yes 13 (93%) Vaccines No 1 (7%) 
 
 
 
Amounts of petty cash sent back to the facilities by the Health Network are volatile, 
making planning difficult and creating disincentives  
 
Each facility collects fees from non-insured patients to cover part of operations costs and 
drugs. The payments are collected separately: the pharmacy charges and receives money only 
for the items it sells and the central cashier charges for all other services, consultation, x-rays, 
and lab tests.  
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As explained above, the resources collected by the central cashier are deposited every day in 
the bank account of the Health Network. A part of these are sent back as petty cash to the 
facility to cover small purchases of goods and services. Furthermore, part of SIS 
reimbursements are also returned to the facilities as petty cash which is used for small urgent 
and non-programmable expenses such as photocopies, transportation, etc.   
 
Even though the survey has only compiled information of three months of petty cash 
remittances, most of the facilities have experienced changes in the level transferred in the 
third month.  Out of twelve facilities, three have double or almost triple the petty cash, and 
another three have increased up to 40 percent. Moreover, SIS petty cash volatility is greater 
since it partly depends on the number of consultations per month, which appears to be 
variable every month. This study found one noteworthy case in which the Head Doctor 
complained to the Health Network about the low level of petty cash transfers and as a result of 
her persistence and determination, the request was approved and doubled This is another 
example of the importance of Head Doctors’ management and negotiation skills.  
 
“I had to complain because the amount was not enough and they duplicated the petty cash 
amount” (notes from surveys). 
 
 
Delay in the arrival of petty cash from own collected resources and SIS reimbursements 
 
All facilities reported delays27 in the arrival of petty cash. Figure 17 shows that the arrival of 
petty cash has a delay range from one week to one month. Variations are even evident 
comparing facilities of the same level. This may indicate discretionary allocation of resources 
by the Health Network. 
 
Figure 17: Delays in the arrival of petty cash at the Facility Level 
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Normally, the resources arrive two weeks after the expenditures are made and, according to 
the results of the survey, the facility has one week (on average) to provide proof of expenses 
                                                 
27 For purposes of the study, the time delay is considered as the time span between the arrival of petty cash and 
the first day of the month to which it corresponds. 
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(receipts, vouchers, affidavits). Most of the expenses are for transportation, preventive health 
and campaigns, maintenance, and photocopies.  
 
Table 15: Delays in the arrival of petty cash and time span for accountability 
 
Average Delay No. of Facilities 
(delay in petty cash) 
No. of Facilities 
(time span for 
accountability) 
One week or less 2 (15%) 13 (100%) 
Two weeks 5 (39%) 0 
Three weeks 4 (31%) 0 
Four weeks or more 2 (15%) 0 
 
 
Technical note: Delays were calculated taking as reference the standard date set 
as the first day of the month. 
 
In the case of petty cash from SIS reimbursements, the situation is more unstable. The 
resources arrived on average four weeks after the expenditures were made and, according to 
the results of the survey, the facility has one week (on average) to provide proof of expenses 
(receipts, vouchers, affidavits).  
 
Table 16: Delays in the arrival of petty cash from SIS reimbursements  
and timespan for accountability 
 
Average Delay No. of Facilities
(delay in petty 
cash) 
No. of Facilities 
(timespan for 
accountability) 
One week or less 0 6 
Between one and two weeks 1 4 
Between two and three weeks 1 1 
Between three and four weeks 0 0 
Between four weeks and two months 2 1 
Two months or more 6 0 
 
 
Technical note: Delays were calculated taking as reference the standard date set as 
the first day of the month.  In the case of SIS, personnel did  not have any 
expectation or idea of when the resources were going to arrive. 
Note: 4 out of 14 facilities did not provide information. 
 
 
 
 
 
Given this situation, the question arises: how does a facility pay for services before receiving 
the money? Facilities cope with this in various ways: by getting credit from providers, by 
having personnel perform needed services, or by paying for goods with their own money We 
found two cases in which the person in charge of petty cash was absent from the facility for 
several days or even on vacation and there was no one else to provide information, not even 
the Head Doctor. During such absences, if expenditures had to be made, the staff sometimes 
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paid out of their own pockets and waited to be reimbursed when the person in charge 
returned.  
 
Petty cash from own collected resources no distributed according to an explicit formula 
 
Head Doctors from the facilities reported that they were not sure if there is a regulation or 
formula regarding the redistribution of the funds through the petty cash allocation process. 
However, according to Health Network staff, the Health Network establishes a fixed amount 
of petty cash for each facility taking into consideration two factors:  
• Historical data on the average amounts of petty cash spent taking into consideration 
facility size.  
• The facility’s capacity to spend petty cash. 
 
Furthermore, the survey results indicate that the Health Network reimburses only the amount 
that was spent by the facilities.  
 
Figure 18: Weight of petty cash in relation to own collected resources by facility level 
(January-March 2008, monthly average) 
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As the information in Figure 18 demonstrates, the weight of petty cash in relation to own 
collected resources varies between facilities. This can be explained by a facility’s capacity to 
collect resources. However, inside each facility level, the situation varies. In the case of C I-3 
facilities, the weight of petty cash in relation to own collected resources is more stable while 
in C I-2 and C I-4 facilities, the range is very wide. 
 
 
Petty cash from SIS reimbursements also are not subject to an explicit formula 
 
According to available information, SIS reimburses the Health Network for consultations and 
drugs. The Health Network sends the fraction related to drugs to the Health Directorate, and 
keeps the money for the purchase of goods, services, and contractual services. Out of this 
second tranche, a percentage is returned to facilities as petty cash to pay for small expenses 
such as transportation, photocopies, and other urgent expenses.  
 
However, the situation in the case of reimbursements through petty cash to facilities is more 
or less similar to that of petty cash from own collected resources, specifically in terms of 
delays and volatility.   Table 17 demonstrates that SIS petty cash for a period of two months 
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could be in the range of 18% to 11%.   This variation could be the result of the difficulties to 
calculate the exact reimbursement amount on time. 
 
Table 17: Weight of petty cash in relation to SIS reimbursements in soles (according to 
the Health Network) 
 
SIS reimbursements 
Facilities 
January February
SIS petty cash 
for Jan. & Feb.
Weight of Petty Cash 
in relation to SIS 
reimbursements 
Facility 9 6,727 3,788 1,985 18.88%
Facility 1 1,784 1,738 594 16.87%
Facility 5 3,832 3,762 1,035 13.63%
Facility 4 6,165 9,478 2,020 12.91%
Facility 12 9,151 9,125 2,046 11.20%
Note: Health Network information was used since information from facilities was not available. 
 
Even though the weight of SIS petty cash in relation to SIS reimbursements is not as variable 
as the weight of petty cash in relation to own collected resources, SIS reimbursements 
depends on the insurance claims that are approved during the month, something that takes a 
long time. In this case, the petty cash from the two first months arrived all together at the end 
of February.  
 
 
Restrictions on the use of petty cash 
 
Independently of the small amounts they receive, facilities cannot spend each amount 
received on more than one item (purchases must respond to immediate needs and efficient 
operations). They can only spend 10 percent of the received amount. To cope with this rigid 
requirement, facilities may split the payment into two or more receipts to comply with 
regulations.  
 
“I had to purchase the cabinet with two receipts (the amount was divided into two parts so as 
not to pass the threshold allowed for the use of petty cash)” (notes from surveys).  
 
At the Networks, according to the relevant legislation, the maximum amount that can be spent 
in cash for the purchase of a good or service  shall be one Tax Revenue Unit (1 UIT).28 The 
value of the UIT for the year 2008 is 3,500 soles.  
 
 
The insurance fund cannot be fully used due to problems in the claims submission 
process 
 
Insurance claims are rejected by the system for different reasons throughout the process: from 
the facility to the Health Network and from the Health Network to the insurance fund. Since 
the service has already been provided, someone has to be bearing the costs.  
 
Affiliation of the poor could be improved, but the interviews revealed that a large number of 
SIS claims are not sent to the central office due to problems related to incorrect or incomplete 
data or the failure to follow protocols.  
 
                                                 
28 Ministerial Resolution No. 434-2006/MINSA. 
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According to SIS affiliation regulations, each beneficiary should be registered in a specific 
facility where he/she must go to receive treatment. SIS insurance will not accept claims of SIS 
patients who receive treatment in a facility other than the one where he/she is already 
registered. The only exception to this rule is when a patient enters a facility through the 
emergency room. 
 
Keeping these rules in mind, let’s imagine a SIS patient who is registered in the facility A. 
This person goes to facility B to receive medical services because he/she believes that this 
facility has better medical equipment or doctors. This can result in two situations: 
 
Situation 1: Facility B refuses to see the patient and sends him/her back to facility A. 
Situation 2: Facility B sees the patient and the SIS central office rejects the claim. In 
this case, the service is financed by the Facility B because the service was already 
provided.  
 
 In situation 2, Facility B absorbs the variable cost of services, including medication and 
consultation.  
 
This loss generates two different effects. In the case of the drugs that were provided to the 
patient but will not be replaced with SIS financing, the facility has to make an accounting 
arrangement to account for the decrease in the stock of drugs. This has a direct impact on the 
availability of drugs for all patients because the quantity of drugs that the Health Directorate 
buys and sends to each facility depends on the reports received from the facilities. In the case 
of consultations, the facility receives no reimbursement for goods (gloves, cotton, alcohol, 
etc.) that were used in providing this service.29  
 
 
Delay in the arrival of remittances for the Vaccination Program campaign 
 
The central administration (MINSA) provides small resources for facilities in order to finance 
transportation, lunches, payments for campaign personnel, and promotion activities. These 
resources are sent to the Health Directorate which is responsible for sending them on to each 
Health Network and these Networks, in turn, distribute them to the facilities. However, in 
most of the cases studied, the remittances arrived at facilities during or at the end of the 
campaign and sometimes they never arrived at all. Triangulation of responses between the 
Health Network and the facilities shows that there is no clear control of the timing of 
remittances. As can be seen in Table 19, only one facility received its remittance at the 
beginning of the campaign during the period interviews were carried out.  
 
Table 18: Comparison of responses from the Health Network and the facilities about 
remittances for the Vaccination Program campaign 
 
Did the facility receive remittances during the last campaign? 
 Health Network’s response Facilities’ responses 
Yes Yes 1 (7%) 
 No 13 (93%) 
 
                                                 
29 We consider salary as a fixed cost because it is not a function of the number of consultations. 
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Table 19: Triangulation of responses from the Health Network and the facilities about 
the timing of remittance deliveries for the vaccination program campaign 
 
When was the remittance delivered during the last campaign? 
 Health Network’s response Facilities’ responses 
 Before or at the beginning 
of the campaign  1 (11%) 
30 days after the start of the 
campaign. During the campaign 2 (14%) 
 At the end or after the 
campaign 11 (79%) 
 
 
 
Table 20: Triangulation of responses between the Health Network and the facilities 
regarding ways of covering the lack of remittances for the Vaccination Program 
campaign 
 
Facilities’ responses 
Health Network’s response 
Options Number of Facilities 
Health Network’s Petty Cash Facilities’ petty Cash 5 (38%) 
Program coordinator’s and/or 
health personnel’s own resources
Facility manager’s and/or 
health personnel’s own 
resources 
5 (38%) 
 Other 3 (23%) 
 
Do the poor pay for preventive health? 
 
As noted above, the petty cash that is returned to the facility is used, among other things, for 
transportation for home visits and for preventive health. The poor are the ones who pay fees in 
facilities. 
 
 
Difficulties in the admission process of new patients for MDR-TB treatment within the 
National Health Strategy for Tuberculosis Prevention and Control 
 
According to two facilities in the sample, the most important delay in the arrival of drugs for 
this strategy is due to the time required for the approval of new patients in the MDR program. 
The relevance of this finding is that if tuberculosis is not treated at the right time, treatment 
becomes more expensive and less effective. Thus, delays  in the approval of treatment for new 
patients can lead to a lower quality of life for the patients and more costs to society and 
governments. The information gathered indicates that these delays are due to scheduling at the 
Health Directorate because this institution has only one meeting a month during which the 
inclusion of new patients can be approved.  
 
The presence of MDR-TB is the result of numerous failures in the healthcare system over 
time: 
• Use of ineffective treatment regimes for MDR-TB during the 1980s and 1990s 
amplified resistance.  
• Persistent MDR-TB cases in communities without timely access to adequate treatment 
increased sources of infection with MDR bacilli among contacts. 
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• Poorly-defined therapeutic policies regarding new MDR-TB cases among contacts of 
documented MDR-TB cases.  
• Underestimation of the magnitude of MDR-TB prevented adequate diagnosis and 
treatment interventions. 
 
An earlier study on the Vigía Project measured the costs of tuberculosis in Peru. The overall 
cost, including drugs, deaths, and disabilities, was nearly US$ 95 million in 1999. 
Furthermore, the study identified other non-monetary costs originating in the loss of 
opportunity as a result of the time lag between the onset of the illness and medical check-ups. 
This makes public intervention less effective. The total budget of the Tuberculosis Prevention 
and Control Program during the time period covered by this study only represented 4.2% of 
tuberculosis total costs, taking into consideration all types of costs (monetary and non-
monetary). 
 
 
Figure 19: Distribution of MDR-TB cases per region (2007) 
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Lima & Callao: 83% of Total National MDR-TB cases 
 
MDR-TB cases per year 
2005: 2,799 
2006: 2,090 
2007: 2,089* (preliminary data) 
Health 
Directorates  
MDR-TB 
cases 
Central Lima 595
East Lima 526
South Lima 367
Callao 168
North Lima 80
La Libertad 70
Ica 59
Ancash 87
Arequipa 44
Lambayeque 35
Junin 21
Ucayali 2
Cuzco 8
Piura I (Piura) 8
Piura II (Sullana) 4
Moquegua 4
Tacna 7
Puno 2
Madre de Dios 2
Tumbes 0
Total 2,089
 
 
Source: Ministry of Health - National Health Strategy for Tuberculosis Prevention and Control  
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Poor biosecurity conditions diminishes TB strategy efficacy 
 
In some facilities, poor infrastructure and difficult conditions impede the provision of  
appropriate treatment for TB patients. For instance, in facilities with a scarcity of protective  
equipment (gloves, face masks), health personnel may suspend the provision of services. 
Furthermore, these adverse conditions reduce medical coverage or even the number of 
professionals interested in implementing the TB strategy because of fear of infection.  
 
 
Differences between the information reported by the Health Network and the facilities 
 
When the information collected from a group of facilities was tringulated with information 
from the Health Network, some cases were found in which the numbers reported were not the 
same. For this analysis, researchers took into consideration information reported by five 
facilities in three variables: the amount of petty cash from own collected resources forwarded, 
the amount of own collected resources, and the amount of petty cash from SIS 
reimbursements. The results show that the information recorded in different levels of the 
health system shows discrepancies.  
 
In the case of petty cash from own collected resources (Table 20), 4 of 5 facilities 
underreported information for two months. On the other hand, in the case of the amount of 
own collected resources (Table 21), there were discrepancies in the information reported by 
both the Health Network and the facilities. Finally, in the case of petty cash from SIS 
reimbursements (Table 22), 2 of 5 facilities underreported,  something that can be explained 
primarily by delays in the arrival of reimbursements to facilities.  
  
Table 20: Triangulation of responses from the Health Network and the facilities regarding the 
amount of petty cash from own collected resources (in soles) 
 
 According to the Health Network According to the facilities  
 January February March January February March 
Facility 12 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Facility 1 800 800 700 500 500 700
Facility 5 1,000 1,000 1,000 500 500 1,000
Facility 9 1,700 1,700 1,500 1,300 1,300 1,500
Facility 4 1,600 1,600 1,200 900 900 1,200
 
Table 21: Triangulation of responses from the Health Network and the facilities regarding the 
amount of own collected resources (in soles) 
 
 According to the Health Network According to the facilities 
 January February March January February March 
Facility 12 12,860 11,837 10,118 9,550 11,054 6,348
Facility 1 8,295 8,815 7,662 8,295 8,815 7,204
Facility 5 9,910 13,521 9,843 10,000 13,613 11,086
Facility 9 18,374 17,997 13,566 18,666 18,194 13,074
Facility 4 12,607 12,799 12,541 19,402 20,750 14,883
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Table 22: Triangulation of responses from the Health Network and the facilities regarding petty 
cash from SIS reimbursements, February 2008 (in soles) 
 
 According to the 
Health Network 
According to the 
facilities  
Facility 12 2,046 - 
Facility 1 594 122 
Facility 5 1,035 1,035 
Facility 9 1,985 1,985 
Facility 4 2,020 2,020 
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F. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. This study followed the money with PETS methodology and found constraints and 
perverse incentives in the salary structure, the use of fee collection and petty cash 
management, procurement rules, and elsewhere. The current context in Peru, 
where a Results-Based Budget (RBB) is being piloted, provides an opportunity to 
incorporate adjustments in the management processes linked with the issues 
mentioned in order to obtain meaningful health outcomes. 
 
2. The development of the study also found the need to assure more transparency in 
the health sector. It is interesting to notice the long process carried out in this study 
to get clearance to apply PETS methodology; but, while the issue of transparency 
is important, of equal importance is the need to understand the complexity of the 
budget flows that this study has depicted as “spaghetti budget flows”.  
 
3. Linked to the previous issue is the urgent need to share knowledge of rules and 
best practices at all levels of the system in order to have a better sense of how the 
system works and who is responsible for what.  Responsibility is fragmented, and 
an issue can be the responsibility of more than one agent. The levels of 
responsibility have to be clear in order to construct a single line towards RBB.  
 
4. Fiscal constraints on hiring personnel with tenure and improving salaries using 
ordinary resources as well as pressures from unions have pushed the health system 
into finding alternatives such as charging and institutionalizing a list of fees to 
cover part of personnel bonuses. The information obtained from the National 
Household Survey in Metropolitan Lima indicates that the poor and the extremely 
poor who seek treatment go to the public sector, moreover, about 76 percent and 
60 per cent of the extremely poor and poor respectively pay for consultation. This 
arrangement has caused the transfer of system costs to the uninsured poor who pay 
for services. The human resources bonus has become dependent on a fragile source 
of income that might disappear as public insurance coverage increases. 
 
5. A related issue is the inequities created in the distribution of fee collections. First, 
there is not an explicit formula for redistribution of funds from the Health Network 
to the facilities, except that this Network pursues equalization. Second, the more 
active clinics are affected by a negative incentive, since they are cross subsidizing 
other facilities. In the urban setting, cross subsidies to the poor clinics is not the 
problem, an issue for consideration is the existence of the probability that poor 
patients in active clinics might be cross subsidizing the poor in poorer areas. Third, 
clinics located in rural areas have fewer benefits than those located in urban areas.   
 
6. The collected fees have ended up not only paying the bonuses but also paying for 
part of the health facility’s goods and services. The purchase of additional goods 
needed with petty cash has been competing with the personal welfare of healthcare 
personnel.  
 
7. In a time of prosperity and growth, the existence of fiscal space creates an 
opportunity to move from dependence on out of pocket payments to tax-based 
financing. This change will put an end to perverse incentives in the initial phase 
and, later, would provide increased funding. Since resources are scarce, and 
currently the government is proposing to slow down public expenditures, a more 
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rigorous process of prioritization would have to be instituted. However, the 
benefits of assuring a better financing base could be enhanced by a human 
resources merit system.  
 
8. There is a weakness at the intermediate level of management. The absence of 
assertive and capable administrative teams results in losses that are translated into 
high opportunity costs.  The latter could be measured considering the time health 
professionals take to carry out administrative and procurement tasks instead of 
working in consultations.  For example, due to deficiencies in the procurement of 
goods and drugs, pharmacy staff and National Strategy coordinators constantly 
have to travel back and forth to the Networks and Directorates to verify the 
existence of stock. In cases when facilities do not obtain drugs and run into 
shortages or delays, personnel have to stop consultations for hours while their 
personnel complain to the unit responsible for the provision of these drugs in order 
to accelerate their delivery and resolve the issue. There is a need to strengthen this 
level of management and its procedures. In this respect, a review of the regulations 
of the National System of Investment has to be carried out to allow for investment 
in human resources. Every investment project in the sector should include an 
institutional development component. 
 
9. Cases of scarcity and delay in supplying medical goods and drugs can jeopardize 
the health of the population. This study detected problems of procurement of 
pharmaceuticals, health inputs, and other goods. These problems exist at the level 
of frontline providers in terms of programming supplies and at the level of 
intermediate bodies—such as the Health Networks and the Health Directorates and 
Ministry of Health—in terms of bidding and purchasing. These problems also 
affected the National Strategies of Vaccination and Tuberculosis Prevention and 
Control; health professionals in order to protect these programs, prefer attending to 
the Strategies and leave other services unattended in terms of goods; or simply not 
controlling TBC patients. A detailed analysis of costs resulting from failures in 
procurement processes should be carried out. Information on these problems has 
not been sufficiently disseminated. Several factors contribute to this scarcity 
scenario, including SIS reimbursements. There is a need for investment in 
adequate storage rooms and related equipment, including tools such as stock 
control mechanisms. 
 
10. The functioning of SIS public insurance may be causing perverse incentives for 
health personnel. In addition, problems in the management of claims result in 
some costs being absorbed or paid for by non-insured patients. There are no 
common objectives (principal-agent) between SIS and the providers. Since SIS 
only covers variable costs and not salaries for doctors and nurses, health personnel 
may be pushed into accepting more non-SIS patients in order to collect fees, 
especially when, as this study indicates, fees represent additional benefits for the 
staff. On the other hand, since drugs are sometimes close to under stocked, 
pharmacists prefer SIS patients so that they can maintain regular levels of 
insurance claim reimbursals related to variable costs; as a result, the needs of non-
insured patients are sacrificed. Moreover, since reimbursements are done ex post 
and are paid two months later, this can cause delays in the purchase of drugs. 
Many of these problems could be solved if SIS adopted a prospective payment 
system and provided explicit positive incentives to healthcare personnel to work 
more with SIS insurance. 
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11. Petty cash, even though it is not a large amount of money, represents an interesting 
facilitating vehicle that some head doctors have used to overcome some 
institutional budget constraints. These resources have been mostly used in 
transportation for promotional activities, and since we are arguing that the poor are 
paying fees, it could be stated that the poor are paying the promotional and 
preventive health services for the poor.  
 
12. Remittances to cover the vaccination campaigns at the level of facilities different 
from petty cash, also experienced delay problems; 11 out of 14 facilities indicated 
that the funds arrived at the end of the campaign. 
 
13. In terms of autonomy, doctors have different perceptions regarding their actual 
level of responsibility and authority. This study found that Head Doctors have 
limited autonomy and authority in terms of human resources management, petty 
cash, and other matters. Likewise, health professionals indicate that supervision 
visits from intermediate agencies do not provide positive guidance to overcome 
any identified limitation.  Throughout this research, the lack of communication 
was noticeable between agencies and even among health professionals from the 
same level of administration.   
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ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1 - Interviewees 
 
 
Open – ended interviews 
 
1. Advisor for Decentralization, Ministry of Health,Vice Minister’s Office 
2. Budget Specialist, Strategic Resources Office ORE, Ministry of Health 
3. Chief of Facility, San Genaro Facility, Chorrillos, Lima 
4. Chief of Planning, Health Directorates, South Lima , Chorrillos Network, Lima 
5. Chief of Research, Statistics General Office, Ministry of Health 
6. Chief of Strategy, National Health Strategy for TBC, Ministry of Health 
7. Chief of Strategy, National Strategy for Sexual and Reproductive Health Care, Health 
Directorate, Central Lima 
8. Coordinator of the National Health Strategy for TBC -Tuberculosis Strategic Resources Office 
ORE, Ministry of Health 
9. Coordinator of the National Health Strategy for Vaccination, Strategic Resources Office ORE, 
Ministry of Health 
10. Coordinator of the National Health Strategy of TBC – Tuberculosis, General Division of 
Pharmaceuticals, DIGEMID, Ministry of Health 
11. Executive Director, Budgetary Office, Ministry of Health 
12. Head of the Research Committee, Health Directorate, Central Lima 
13. Remittances Coordinator, Strategic Resources Office, ORE Ministry of Health 
14. Technician, National Health Strategy for Vaccination, Ministry of Health 
 
Closed- ended interviews / surveys: 14 health facilities 
 
Typical team interviewed/survey in each facility 
1. Head Doctor 
2. Pharmacists 
3. National Strategy Responsible in Tuberculosis and Vaccinations (could be one or two persons) 
4. Lab Specialist 
5. Store Room Administrator 
6. Human Resources Coordinators (could be nurses or administrative assistants) 
7. Petty Cash, Goods and Services (Logística) Coordinator (could be one or two persons, in most 
of the cases were administrative technicians) 
8. General Cashier 
9. Pharmacy Cashier 
10. SIS Administrative Assistants (data input management) 
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 Annex 2 - Characteristics of Health Directorate II South Lima (DSLS) 
 
 
Health Directorate Health Networks  Health Micro-Network 
Surco 
Urbana 
Barranco – 
Chorrillos – Surco 
Villa 
Manuel Barreto 
Leonor Saavedra - Villa San Luis 
Trebol Azul - San Juan 
Ollantay 
Jose Galvez - Nueva Esperanza 
Villa Maria - Jose Carlos Mariategui 
San Juan de 
Miraflores – Villa 
María del Triunfo 
 
Daniel Alcides Carrión - Tablada de Lurin 
San José 
Juan Pablo II 
Cesar Lopez Silva 
San Martin de Porres 
Lurin 
Pachacamac 
San Bartolo 
II South Lima 
(DSLS)  
 
Villa El Salvador – 
Lurin – Pachacamac 
– Pucusana 
 
Portada de Manchay 
 
 
Demographics - Health Directorate II South Lima: Distribution of population in districts by 
age, 2007 
 
Districts Total Children  (0 to 9)   
Adolescents 
(10 to 19)  
Adults 
(20 to 
59)  
Older 
Adults (over 
60 )  
Total 1,877,983 328,232 336,560 1,036,386  176,805 
Barranco  35,026  6,122 6,277  19,329  3,298 
Chorrillos 274,827 48,035  49,253 151,666   25,873 
Santiago de Surco 290,671 50,804  52,091 160,410   27,366 
Lurin  61,396 10,731  11,002  33,883  5,780 
Pachacamac  65,276 11,410  11,698  36,022  6,146 
Pucusana  10,608  1,855 1,901 5,855  997 
Punta Hermosa 5,022  877 902 2,770  473 
Punta Negra 5,021  877 901 2,770  473 
San Bartolo 6,355  1,110 1,139 3,507  599 
San Juan de Miraflores 349,573 61,098  62,650 192,916   32,909 
Santa Maria del Mar 80 10 11 50   9 
Villa El Salvador 395,340 69,098  70,851 218,172   37,219 
Villa Maria del Triunfo 378,788 66,205  67,884 209,036   35,663 
Source: National Population Census 2005. National Institute of Statistics (INEI).  
Prepared by: the Technical Office for Demography of INEI and the General Office for Statistics and Information 
(OGEI) of the Ministry of Health.  
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Health Profile – Health Directorate II South Lima.  Principal causes of general morbidity in 
outpatient consultations by sex, 2006.  
 
Total % Women % Men % Causes 
1,149,444 100.0 672,812 100.0 476,632 100.0 
Acute infections of the upper 
respiratory system  337,845 29.4 172,822 25.7 165,023 34.6 
Mouth, salivary glands and maxillary 
ailments. 133,542 11.6 86,101 12.8 47,441 10.0 
Infectious intestinal diseases 98,376 8.6 48,815 7.3 49,561 10.4 
Chronic respiratory diseases 54,523 4.7 26,211 3.9 28,312 5.9 
Other urinary system ailments  26,770 2.3 22,596 3.4 4,174 0.9 
Ailments of the esophagus, stomach, 
and duodenum 20,837 1.8 13,996 2.1 6,841 1.4 
Dermatitis and eczema  19,786 1.7 10,721 1.6 9,065 1.9 
Mycosis  17,838 1.6 11,041 1.6 6,797 1.4 
Inflammatory ailments of organs  17,224 1.5 17,224 2.6   0.0 
Helminthiasis (b65 - b83) 16,586 1.4 9,340 1.4 7,246 1.5 
Other ailments 406,117 35.3 253,945 37.7 152,172 31.9 
Source: OGEI/MINSA. 
 
 
Production - Health Directorate II South Lima. Patients treated and outpatient consultations 
by life stages - 2006 
 
 Total Men Women 
Life Stages 
Patients 
treated Consultations 
Patients 
treated Consultations 
Patients 
treated Consultations 
Total 752,041 2,531,824 272,760 812,783 479,281 1,719,041 
Children  
(0 to 9 years old)   259,167 902,933 133,660 460,810 125,507 442,123 
Adolescents 
(10 to 19 years 
old)  128,324 349,351 49,133 113,071 79,191 236,280 
Adults (20 to 59 
years old)  334,102 1,170,581 77,503 196,282 256,599 974,299 
Older Adults 
(over 60 years old) 30,448 108,959 12,464 42,620 17,984 66,339 
Source: Statistics from Health Directorate II South Lima.   
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Annex 3 - Geographical distribution of health facilities in the  
Barranco-Chorrillos-Surco Network  
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Annex 4 - Characteristics of a C I-3 Health Facility  
 
Standard characteristics that a C I-3 facility should have: 
 
Characteristics:  
 
Should have at least one: 
Doctor 
Nurse 
Midwife 
Nurse Technician or Auxiliary Nurse  
Odontologist 
Laboratory Technician 
Pharmacy Technician 
Statistics Technician or Statistics Auxiliary 
Pharmacy: 
Human Resources 
Infrastructure 
Equipment 
Organization 
Resolution capacity 
Clinic laboratory: 
Human Resources 
Infrastructure 
Equipment 
Organization 
Resolution capacity 
External service 
Production units and their 
respective functions: 
 
Community and environmental health 
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Annex 5 - Focus of Health Strategies 
 
National Health Strategy for Vaccinations (ESN INMUNIZACIONES) 
 
• The actions related to this strategy are implemented on the first, second, and third level of 
|healthcare. ESN IMMUNIZACIONES activities are included in the package of basic 
services (Integral Care by Life Stages) and include prevention and promotion actions. 
• Includes a “Vaccination Plan” approved in 2005 that was framed in accordance with 
Ministry of Health policy guidelines, national health priorities, and the Millennium 
Development Objectives.  
• ESN IMMUNIZACIONES has various financing sources. The Public Treasury provides 
70 percent of the budget and additional resources come from donations, external 
reimbursable resources or loans. The remaining 15 percent comes from other sources 
including the private sector. Currently, regional and local governments provide diverse 
resources (human, economic, material, etc.) to entities implementing ESN 
IMMUNIZACIONES. 
 
The National Health Strategy for Tuberculosis Prevention and Control (ESN-PCT)  
 
• The National Health Strategy for Tuberculosis Prevention and Control (ESN-PCT) is part 
of General Directorate for the Health of Individuals (DGSP) of the Ministry of Health 
(MINSA). 
• The ESN-PCT is charged with establishing the principles, standards, and procedures for 
the control of tuberculosis (TB) in Peru. It also guarantees detection, diagnosis, and free-
of-charge treatment to all patients with TB and MDR-TB in all facilities.  
• TB is a curable disease that affects the economically active population. The most 
vulnerable group is those from 15 to 54 years of age; teenagers and older adults constitute 
one third of the cases.   
• Currently, approximately 60 percent of cases of all types of tuberculosis and 82 percent of 
MDR-TB cases are concentrated in Lima and Callao. In the interior, the regions with the 
highest levels of tuberculosis are Madre de Dios, Ucayali, Tacna, Loreto, and Ica.  
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Annex 6 – Location of healthcare delivery for the non-poor 
(Metropolitan Lima, 2006) 
 
 
 
Non-poor
24%
15% 15%
10% 9% 9% 8%
5%
2% 1% 1%
Ph
ar
m
ac
y
Pr
iv
at
e 
cl
in
ic
So
ci
al
 se
cu
rit
y 
Ho
sp
ita
l 
Pr
iv
at
e 
do
ct
or
´s 
of
fic
e
He
al
th
 C
en
te
r M
IN
SA
Ho
sp
ita
l M
IN
SA
He
al
th
 P
os
t M
IN
SA
So
ci
al
 se
cu
rit
y
fa
ci
lit
ie
s
Ar
m
y 
Po
lic
e 
Ho
sp
ita
l
Ho
m
e
Ot
he
rs
 
 
Universidad del Pacifico Research Center 68
Annex 7 - Detailed description of in-kind flows (pharmaceuticals) 
 
The provision of pharmaceuticals is organized through SISMED (Integrated System for 
Pharmaceutical Provisions and Supplies) which includes various within the Ministry of Health, the 
Health Directorates, the Health Networks, and the facilities and delineates the regulations and 
responsibilities of each unit according to seven steps: selection, programming, procurement, storage, 
distribution, use, and reporting. 
 
Even though difficulties can be found in each these steps, this study focuses on four steps: 
programming, procurement, storage, and distribution.  
 
SISMED regulations are contained in two documents: 
• Ministerial Resolution No. 1753-2002-SA/DM. Approves the directives for the Integrated 
System for Pharmaceutical Provisions and Supplies - SISMED (November 10, 2002). 
• Ministerial Resolution No.  367-2005/MINSA. Modifies the directives for the Integrated System 
for Pharmaceutical Provisions and Supplies - SISMED (May 19, 2005). 
 
SISMED PARTICIPANTS  
 
Ministry of Health 
The following areas: 
 
• General Directorate for Pharmaceuticals, Supplies, and Drugs (Dirección General de 
Medicamentos Insumos y Drogas - DIGEMID)  
Responsible for regulating, articulating, monitoring, supervising, providing technical assistance. 
and for implementing the processes and functions of the SISMED system.  
 
• General Directorate for the Health of Individuals (Dirección General de Salud de las Personas - 
DGSP)  
Responsible for regulating, monitoring, and reviewing healthcare guidelines and protocols of 
Health Networks as well as ensuring the quality of healthcare delivery to users with an emphasis 
on the use of pharmaceuticals in healthcare interventions.  
 
• General Office for Administration (Oficina General de Administración - OGA)  
Responsible for preparing directives and instructions and providing technical assistance on 
administrative functions related to logistics, accounting, and budget execution in the SISMED 
system. 
 
• Integrated Health Insurance (Seguro Integral de Salud - SIS) 
Responsible for ensuring financing and timely reimbursement for services provided to patients 
covered by the Insurance Fund. 
 
• Health Directorates / Regional Health Directorates 
Responsible for providing leadership, management, monitoring, control, supervision and 
evaluating the performance of the SISMED system as well as consolidating, analyzing and 
submitting the information generated in the facilities under its jurisdiction and providing feedback. 
 
• Facilities 
Responsible for programming, requesting, storing, and dispensing pharmaceuticals and medical-
surgical supplies as well as maintaining the information generated by the SISMED updated.  
 
SOURCES OF FINANCING 
• Resources obtained from the sale of pharmaceuticals.  
• Financial resources allocated by SIS from reimbursements for pharmaceuticals. 
• Financial allocations from the National Treasury for the procurement of pharmaceuticals.  
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• International Cooperation resources and other sources for procurement of pharmaceuticals when 
there is the clear intention to permit the sale of pharmaceuticals. 
• Financial resources from donations received for the procurement of pharmaceuticals, only if the 
donor explicitly agrees that these products be sold.   
• Financial resources obtained through repayments from the General Office of National Defense 
through the OGA for the delivery of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to patients affected by 
emergencies or disasters. 
 
PROCUREMENT OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
Procurements can be carried out on the following levels: 
 
a.- National level: National purchases. 
b.- Regional level: Regional purchases. 
c.- Institutional level: Institutional purchases. 30 
 
National purchases  
Purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies used in large quantities in facilities and whose 
purchase has an impact on the national budget. The OGA is in charge of these purchases.  
 
Regional purchases  
Purchases of all pharmaceuticals and medical supplies not included in national purchases. Health 
Directorates or Regional Health Directorates are in charge of these purchases.  
 
EXPENSES 
The resources of the SISMED Revolving Fund can only be used for:  
a. Procurement of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies.  
b. Hiring of professionals and pharmacy technicians associated with the SISMED system.  
c. Information technology.  
d. Drugs for poor patients not covered by any insurance or health interventions.  
e. Transfers to other public institutions when there is a risk of expiration. (sic) [as it is understood, it 
should be in-kind transferes]. 
f. Equipment, improvements, expansion, construction and/or upgrading of storage and information 
networks and distribution in the SISMED system and implementation of the Storage and Dispensing 
Good Practices.  
g. Implementation of cost containment strategies and improving the quality of pharmaceuticals.  
h. Promotion of the rational use of pharmaceuticals, drug monitoring, and the Pharmaceutical Unit 
Dose Care System.  
i. Implementation of pharmaceutical information centers.  
j. Development of the skills of human resources in concordance with IDREH.  
k. Other expenditures on goods and services strictly linked to the SISMED system. 
 
It is forbidden to spend resources from the SISMED Revolving Fund on food baskets, uniforms, and 
other items delivered directly to workers in the form of job benefits and which are not directly related 
to the activities of the SISMED system.  
 
Ten percent of the operation price is intended to cover the costs of health facilities, specified in items 
(b-k above). The remaining 10 percent is to be used to cover the costs of the  Executive Directorate 
for Pharmaceuticals, Supplies, and Drugs (DEMID), specified in items (b-k above).  
 
Administrative costs directly related to the SISMED system for funds earmarked for the purchase of 
pharmaceuticals which SIS reimburses to the Health Directorates or the Regional Health Directorates 
are financed.  
                                                 
30 This is the purchase of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies not included in national or regional purchases 
but rather purchased by hospitals, which are executing units, and by specialized institutes. This study only 
examines national and regional purchases. 
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DEPOSITS  
From the sale of pharmaceuticals:  
100 percent of the funds from the sale of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to patients not covered 
by SIS and from health interventions by all primary care level facilities are deposited in the bank 
account of the SISMED Fund.  
 
SIS reimbursements:  
Financial resources constituting SIS reimbursements for that part of the pharmaceuticals that were 
provided to patients are sent directly from SIS to the accounts of the Health Directorates/Regional 
Health Directorates and are equivalent to the pharmaceuticals and medical supplies consumed (valued 
at the cost of operation).31  
 
Reimbursements and remittances from the OGA:  
The OGA sends the Health Directorates/Regional Health Directorates reimbursement funds equivalent 
to the pharmaceuticals and medical supplies designated as medicamentos de soporte consumed in  
health interventions, valued at the cost of operation. The Health Directorate purchased medicamentos 
de soporte. 
 
Once the national purchases are done (medicamentos estratégicos), pharmaceuticals and medical 
supplies are sent in-kind to the Health Directorates/Regional Health Directorates, which is depicted in 
the flows shown in Figure 7 as in-kind transfers. 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
The  Executive Directorate for Pharmaceuticals, Supplies, and Drugs (DEMID) is responsible 
for filling, in a timely manner, orders for pharmaceuticals and medical supplies from health facilities 
that are not executing units32 under its jurisdiction. 
 
EVALUATION INDICATORS OF THE SISMED SYSTEM  
The provision of essential drugs in a timely manner and in the quantities necessary to meet the health 
needs of the population is one of the critical factors relating to access to drugs and are indicators of the 
level of efficiency in the management of the supply system. For this reason, the SISMED system 
monitors the management of DISA/DIRESA employing the following set of indicators: 
 
Indicator Description  Sub-indicators 
Drugs 
Availability 
Measures the 
level of drug 
supplies in 
health 
facilities.  
 
 
• Percentage of drugs with acceptable availability (there is 
sufficient stock in optimum conditions to meet demand for 1 to 
6 months of regular consumption). 
• Percentage of drugs with unacceptable availability (there is an 
overstock of drugs in optimum conditions for 6 months average 
consumption or drugs not consumed in the months evaluated, 
without rotation).  
• Percentage of drugs with critical availability (there is 
insufficient stock to meet one month’s average consumption or 
no stock at all.) 
 
The availability of drugs in Health Directorates and Regional Health Directorates for the year 2007 
varied considerably—the national average of drugs whose availably was at a critically low level is 20 
percent. 
 
 Health Directorates / Regional Indicators of Availability 2007 Availability 
                                                 
31 The cost of operation is the sales price. 
32 Executing Units such as Health Directorates are the only units permitted to buy drugs. 
 
 
Universidad del Pacifico Research Center 71
 Health Directorates Acceptable 
(A) 
Not Acceptable
(B) 
Critical 
(C) 
2007 
(A) + (B) 
1º AYACUCHO 38.81% 49.45% 11.74% 88.26% 
2º JUNIN 39.25% 48.79% 11.96% 88.04% 
3º AREQUIPA 44.76% 43.09% 12.15% 87.85% 
4º TACNA 52.06% 34.40% 13.54% 86.46% 
5º CUSCO 50.62% 35.63% 13.76% 86.24% 
6º SAN MARTIN 44.45% 40.54% 15.01% 84.99% 
7º CUTERVO-CAJAMARCA III 37.07% 47.31% 15.61% 84.39% 
8º 
CHANKA-ANDAHUAYLAS-
APURIMAC II 31.18% 52.88% 15.93% 84.07% 
9º LIMA SUR (Lima II) 60.25% 23.72% 16.04% 83.96% 
10º PUNO 32.14% 51.06% 16.80% 83.20% 
11º MADRE DE DIOS 32.32% 50.52% 17.17% 82.83% 
12º PIURA I 39.24% 43.46% 17.30% 82.70% 
13º HUANCAVELICA 44.04% 38.58% 17.38% 82.62% 
14º TUMBES 45.95% 35.55% 18.50% 81.50% 
15º JAEN 45.48% 36.00% 18.52% 81.48% 
16º LA LIBERTAD 38.76% 42.19% 19.05% 80.95% 
17º APURIMAC I 33.05% 47.66% 19.29% 80.71% 
18º PASCO 39.35% 41.21% 19.44% 80.56% 
19º LIMA NORTE (Lima III) 40.59% 38.84% 20.56% 79.44% 
20º LIMA ESTE (Lima IV) 60.25% 19.02% 20.73% 79.27% 
21º LIMA CIUDAD (Lima V) 51.83% 26.80% 21.37% 78.63% 
22º CALLAO (Lima I) 39.71% 38.90% 21.39% 78.61% 
23º HUANUCO 44.76% 33.83% 21.41% 78.59% 
24º UCAYALI 35.56% 42.43% 22.01% 77.99% 
25º AMAZONAS 32.62% 45.36% 22.03% 77.97% 
26º CAJAMARCA I 38.78% 38.49% 22.73% 77.27% 
27º SULLANA - PIURA II 37.78% 39.24% 22.98% 77.02% 
28º ANCASH 31.49% 43.03% 25.48% 74.52% 
29º CHOTA-CAJAMARCA II 34.91% 39.38% 25.71% 74.29% 
30º ICA 36.16% 35.18% 28.66% 71.34% 
31º LAMBAYEQUE 30.68% 38.20% 31.12% 68.88% 
32º LORETO 30.63% 36.52% 32.85% 67.15% 
33º MOQUEGUA 27.32% 35.81% 36.86% 63.14% 
National Average 40.07% 39.80% 20.13% 79.87% 
Source: DIGEMID/MINSA, 
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Annex 8 - Health Directorates (DISA) EU that did not plan for anti 
tuberculosis drugs, 2007 
 
 
 
Source: National Health Strategy for Tuberculosis Prevention and Control. 
 
Dirección de Salud Pirazinamida Etambutol Rifampicina Isoniacida Estreptomicina 
Amazonas X
Arequipa X X X
Ancash X X
Apurimac II X
Bagua X
Cajamarca X
Cajamarca II X
Cajamarca III X
Callao X X
Cusco X X
Ica X X X X
La Libertad X X
Lima Norte X
Pasco X X X X
Piura II X X X X
Puno X X
San Martín X X X
Ucayali X
 
 
Universidad del Pacifico Research Center 73
 
Annex 9 - Facilities Survey Template 
 
FACILITIES SURVEY 
 
a) No. of  Survey 
 
 b) Interview Date  
c) Name of the person conducting survey 1: 
 
 
d) Name of the person conducting survey 2: 
 
Identification of the Facility 
 
 
 
FACILITY HEAD DOCTOR SURVEY 
 
Information on the Head Doctor  
 
10. Name of Facility Head 
Doctor: 
 
 
11. Sex: 1 = Female 
2 = Male  
 12. Type of 
contract: 
1 = Permanent employee 
2 = Contract worker 
 
i.Years  13. Working experience as Head Doctor in this 
Facility: 
ii.Months  
i. Years  14. Working experience as Head Doctor in any 
facility or as the Director of any DISA/ 
DIRESA: ii. Months  
 
1. Facility Name 
 
1b. Type of Facility 
1: CLAS  
0: NO CLAS 
 
2. Department 
 
3. Province 
 
4. District   
 
5. Facility Code  6. Facility 
Location (INEI, 
location code 
UBIGEO) 
 
7. Name of Network the facility is a part of : 
 
8. Name the Micro-Network the facility is part of : 
 
9. Is the Facility the head of the Micro Network? 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
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Detail of the services: 
 
General attention in 
services: 
15. Do you 
have this 
service? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
16. Number of 
days per 
week that the 
service 
operates 
17. Fee 
(Soles) 
18. Attention shift 
1 = 6 hours (8 a.m. – 2 p.m.) 
2 = 12 hours  
(8 a.m. – 2 p.m. / 2 p.m. – 8 p.m.) 
3 = 24 hours 
i. General Medicine     
ii. Obstetrics     
iii. Odontology     
iv. Psychology     
v. Pharmacy     
vi. Pediatrics     
vii. Emergency     
viii. Laboratory     
ix.      
x.      
 
19. Do you have a 24 hours shifts for assisting in 
births? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
20. Comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Who approves the price list? 1 = DISA 
2 = Network 
3 = Micro Network 
4 = Facility 
 
22. Do you have approval for you current 
price list? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
24. If you requested an adjustment, were 
you able to modify the price list?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 23. During the time 
you have been in 
charge, did you 
request any 
adjustments to 
your price list?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
 
25. Comments:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. Survey administrator: mark if you were shown the price list in the 
facility 
1 = Yes  
2 = No 
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Autonomy: 
27. Do you consider that you have autonomy 
regarding the following issues?  
From 1 to 5, when 1 is zero autonomy and 5 is 
great autonomy, rate your level of autonomy in 
each of the following:  
Issues 
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Human resources and schedules allocation      
ii. Establishment of the price list      
iii. In-kind purchases       
iv. Quantity of in-kind received by the facility      
v. Equipment purchase      
vi. Use of equipment      
vii. Drug purchases      
viii. Quantity of drugs received by the facility      
ix. Establishment of the amount of petty cash      
x. Use of petty cash      
  
Diagnosis 
28. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most important 
problems that the facility faces in 
relation to human resources?  
1 = Lack of personnel 
2 = High personnel rotation 
3 = Personnel with insufficient 
qualifications 
4 = Lack of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives 
5 = Others (specify)  
6 = No problems 
Example: 1,4 
29. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most important 
problems that the facility faces in 
relation to drugs? 
1 = Non-fulfillment / Ignorance of proper 
storage practices 
2 = Inadequate infrastructure 
3 = Delay in notification about drugs ready 
for pick up the medicine from DISA 
4 = Lack of availability in DISA  
5 = Others (specify) 
6 = No problem 
 
30. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most important 
problems that the facility faces in 
relation to in-kind supplies?  
1 = Delays receiving of in-kind 
2 = Reductions in the amount of in-kind 
received 
3 = Deliveries of unrequested in-kind 
4 = Others (specify) 
5 = No problem 
 
31. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most important 
problems that the facility faces in 
relation to the National Health Strategy 
for Tuberculosis Prevention and 
Control? 
1 = Lack of equipment 
2 = Delays or reductions in the amount of 
drugs received by the facility 
3 = Biosecurity 
4 = Others (specify) 
5 = No problem 
 
32. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most important 
problems that the facility faces in 
relation to the Vaccination Program? 
1 = Lack of equipment 
2 = Delays in the arrival of remittances 
3 = Delays or reduction in the amount of 
vaccines received by the facility 
4 = Others (specify) 
5 = No problem 
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INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE OF PERSONNEL, IN-KIND,  AND PETTY CASH  
 
 
Personnel 
 
2008 33. Availability of human resources by 
professional group or technicians 
from all sources (number)  
A. Permanent 
employees
B. Contract 
workers 
C. Total 
Total working at the facility:    
a. Doctors    
b. Nurses    
c. Midwives    
d. Dentists    
e. Social work assistants     
f. Psychologists    
g. Others health professionals    
h. X-rays technicians    
i. Laboratory technicians     
j. Nursing technicians    
k. Pharmacy technicians     
l. Sanitary Inspectors    
m. Administrative technicians    
n. Statistics technicians     
o. Transportation technicians    
p. Statistics assistants     
q. Service workers    
r. Craftsman    
s. Health service assistants    
t. Cleaning personnel    
u. Other technician or assistants    
34. SERUMS (rural or marginal urban 
health services)  
   
a. PAAG (Program for the 
Admin. of Management 
Agreements)  
   
b.     
c.     
 
 
Total - professionals   (from i to iii)  
Total - other professionals  (from iv to vii)  
Total - sanitary technicians   (from viii to xii)  
Total - other technicians or assistants (from xiii from xxii)  
 
 
35. Are all the personnel paid through Multired, Banco de 
la Nación?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
36. Are payments for productivity also paid through the 
Banco de la Nación?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
37. Explain: 
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For the last twelve 
months: 
38. Was there a delay in 
payment of personnel?  
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
39. How often did delays 
take place? 
 
1 = Never 
2 = Once  
3 = Between 2 and 3 times 
4 = Between 4 and 6 times 
If there were delays, 
on average how long 
were they in days?  
a. Permanent 
employees 
   
b. Contract workers    
 
40. If there were delays, why did they occur?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the beginning of 
2007 to date:  
41. Did you submit 
an official request  
for more personnel 
in the following 
categories of 
professionals or 
technicians?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
42. How 
many 
personnel did 
you request in 
to each 
category?  
(number) 
43. How many 
personnel were 
assigned to you 
in each category?  
(number) 
44. How much 
time passed from 
submission of the 
official request 
and its approval?  
(months) 
a. Doctors     
b. Nurses     
c. Midwives     
d. Dentists     
e. Social 
workers 
    
f. Psychologists     
g. Other 
professionals 
or health 
technicians  
    
h. Other 
professionals 
or 
administrative 
technicians 
    
 
45. In general, if there was a delay in the approval of personnel requests and/or in the arrival personnel at 
the facility, why do you think this happened?  
 
 
 
 
 
46. ¿Which system do you use for controlling personnel 
attendance? 
1 = Book with signatures 
2 = Timecard 
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47. Do you think your control system for attendance allows you to supervise properly?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
48. From the beginning of the 
year to date, has the facility 
received visits from the following 
institutions to supervise 
personnel?  
49. ¿How 
many 
visits? 
50. Was the 
purpose of the 
visit to verify 
personnel 
attendance?  
51. Was the purpose of the visit 
to evaluate insecurity 
conditions, number of 
personnel, work conditions, 
etc?  
 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
number 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
a. DISA 
 
    
b. NETWORK 
 
    
c. MICRORED 
 
    
 
 
52. What were the recommendations after the visits?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Utilities 
 
  a. Water and 
sewage 
b. Electricity c. Telephone 
53. During the last 12 
months, were your 
utilities cut or did 
you receive a 
warning of a cut due 
to delays in payment 
 
1 = Never 
2 = Once 
3 = Between two and three 
times 
4 = More than three times 
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Petty Cash – Own collected resources  
 
Cash period 54. When did you receive 
petty cash 
corresponding to the 
following periods?    
Month / day 
(0 if no cash was  
received) 
55. How much 
was received 
(in soles)? 
 
 
56. After receiving the petty 
cash, how many days 
were left for presenting 
receipts of expenses? 
(accountability)  
Month / day 
a. January 2008    
b. February 2008    
c. March 2008    
 
57. How did you spend the petty cash? 
a.  b.  
c.  d.  
 
Petty cash  - Integral Health Insurance (Seguro Integral de Salud) 
 
Cash period 58. When did you receive 
the petty cash 
corresponding to the 
following periods?   
 
Month / day 
(0 if no cash received) 
59. How much 
it was 
received 
(soles)? 
 
 
60. After receiving the petty 
cash, how many days 
were left for presenting 
receipts of expenses? 
(accountability)  
 
Month / day 
a January 2008    
b. February 2008    
c. March 2008    
 
 
61. How did you spend the petty cash? (Goods, medical salaries etc.) 
a.  b.  
c.  d.  
 
 
62. What are the five most frequent expenditures that you would have like to make that are currently 
not permitted by current legislation regarding petty cash?  
a.  
 
b.  
 
c.  
 
d.  
 
e.  
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 63. Since the beginning of the year to date, has 
the facility received visits from the 
following institutions to collect information 
about the use of petty cash?  
64. How many 
visits? 
 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Number 
a. NETWORK   
b. OCI – NETWORK 
(Institutional Control Office)  
 
  
c. Micro-Network    
 
65. What recommendations were made after the visits? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goods for consumption  
 
66. What are the five goods 
most consumed in the 
facility?  
67. Did you 
know in 
advance when 
goods were 
going to arrive 
to the facility? 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
68. During the 
last twelve 
months, did you 
have shortages of 
any of the 
following goods?  
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
69. How long 
did the 
shortages last? 
 
(days) 
70. If there were 
shortages, why did 
they occur?  
 
1 = reduced 
amount received 
2 = delay in  
arrival  
3 = other 
a.  
 
    
b.  
 
    
c.  
 
    
d.  
 
    
e.  
 
    
 
71. Comments (only in case that delays occurred due to other issues) 
 
 
 
 
72. How did you solve your shortage problems?  
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73. During the last twelve months, did you 
receive any good that you did not request or 
need?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 Specify: 
74. Do any of your medical services pick up 
their goods directly from the Network or 
the Micro-Network? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
75. Did you sign the PECOSA (record of 
payment and arrival of goods) for all the 
goods that arrived at the facility?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
76. Are all the goods stored in the same room?  1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
76.b Comments: 
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 Equipment  
 
77. Under your management, did the facility officially submit requests 
additional equipment and/or furniture?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
78. Type of equipment and/or furniture 
requested  
79. When did you 
submit the 
request?  
80. Have you 
received a 
response to 
the request?  
81. If the request was 
approved, when 
did you receive 
items requested? 
(name) month/year 1 = Yes 
2 = No  
month/year 
a.     
b.     
c.     
 
82. Have you ever purchased equipment or furniture with petty cash?  1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
83. Comments: 
 
 
 
84. Have you ever received equipment or furniture that you did 
not request or need?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
85. Comments: 
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INTEGRAL HEALTH INSURANCE (SIS) DATA-INPUT STAFF MEMBER AT 
THE FACILITY  
 
Public insurance reimbursement for attention of SIS patients  
 
 a. January b. February c. March 
86. During each of these 
months, how many forms 
were generated?  
   
87. How many forms were 
approved by the facility? 
(preventive quality 
control  
   
88. How many forms were 
approved by the 
Network?  
   
89. How many forms did SIS 
approve?  
   
90. How much was 
reimbursed by SIS?  
(soles) 
soles soles soles 
91. When was 
reimbursement received? 
(Record the number of 
installments in which it 
arrived) 
Example: February and 
April 
  
 
 
 
PERSON IN CHARGE OF GENERAL CASH  
 
Collection in pharmacy for medical services and drug expenditures  
 
 92. How much was collected in general 
cash for medical services (soles)?  
93. How much was collected in 
general cash for drug expenditures 
in the pharmacy (soles)?  
a. January 2008   
b. February 2008   
c. March 2008   
 
94. How frequently is money collected money for 
medical services deposited in the account of the 
Network?  
1 = Daily 
2 = Weekly 
3 = Other (specify) 
 
95. How frequently is the money collected for drug 
expenditures deposited in the drug fund account 
(SISMED Revolving Fund)?  
1 = Daily 
2 = Weekly 
3 = Other (specify) 
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PERSON IN CHARGE OF PHARMACY  
 
 
 Drugs and vaccines storage  
 
96.  Does the facility have a storeroom or space assigned 
for the drugs received from DISA / the Network or 
other sources?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
97. Does the facility have a storeroom or space assigned 
for the vaccines received from the DISA / Network or 
by other sources? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
98. Who registers the vaccines that there are in the 
storeroom? (Fill in the control stock card)  
1 = Pharmacy 
2 = PTC National Program 
coordinators  
3 = Both 
 
99. Have you had (or do you have) any objections or limitations regarding storage/management of the 
drugs or vaccines stock? 
 
 
 
 
 
Drugs 
 
  a. January b. February  c. March
100.  
a. What percentage of drugs is in 
OVERSTOCK (over 6 months 
supply)? 
%    
b. What percentage of the drugs 
are in NORMAL STOCK 
(between 4 and 6 months’ 
Supply)?  
%    
c. What percentage of drugs is in 
SUB STOCK (between 1 and 4 
months’ supply)?  
%    
d. What percentage of drugs is in 
UNDERSTOCK (less than 1 
month’s supply)? 
%    
a+b+c+d= 100%     
 
 
101. Comments  
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102. In relation to deliveries of 
drugs, choose the most frequently 
occurring situation from the 
following list:  
DEMID or DISA:  
1 = Delivers the complete order at the expected 
date  
2 = Delivers the complete order with a delay  
3 = Delivers an incomplete order at the expected 
date 
4 = Delivers an incomplete order with a delay   
 
103. In the last 12 months, have 
you ever restricted the sale of drugs 
to protect the stock for SIS patients? 
1 = Yes, once 
2 = Yes, two or more times  
3 = No 
 
104. What are the five drugs required 
most frequently at the pharmacy?  
105. In the last 12 
months, have the drugs 
mentioned been affected by 
shortages? 
106. If the answer is yes, 
how many days did the 
shortage last?  Take into 
account all occurrences.    
Name 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
days 
a.    
b.    
c.    
d.    
e.    
 
107. Why did the shortage 
occur? (more than one option 
can be selected) 
1 = Delay in the requirement from the Micro- 
Network to the DEMID 
2 = Communication problems between the Micro- 
Network and the facility. 
3 = Lack of stock in DISA/DEMID storage 
4 = Others 
 
108. Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
Medicine consumed by SIS patients (patient supply) 
 
 109. Value of drugs consumed by the SIS patients (soles)   
a. January 2008  
b. February 2008  
c. March 2008  
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110. During this year, has the facility 
received visits from the following 
institutions to collect information about 
drugs?  
111. How 
many visits 
did you 
receive in the 
last three 
months? 
 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Number 
112. What were the reasons for the visit? 
1 = To verify the use of the price list  
2 = To verify that the facility does not have 
expired drugs in storage 
3 = To verify the stock of drugs 
a. MINSA    
b. DISA (DEMID)    
c. Network    
d. Micro-Network     
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PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH STRATEGY FOR 
TUBERCULOSIS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (ESN-PCT) 
 
113. Number of cases diagnosed in 2007  
114. Profession of the person in charge of ESN-PCT in the 
facility  
 
 
 115. Average 
number of days 
between order 
submission and the 
arrival of drugs 
from the DEMID/ 
the hospital (MDR) 
 
116. Previous 
knowledge of 
pick up date 
  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
117. Delays in 
the arrival of 
drugs during the 
last 12 months. 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
118. Shortages 
of any of 
Tuberculosis 
drugs during the 
last 12 months 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
a. Primary Plan (EP)  
 
   
b.Multidrug-resistant 
(MDR) 
 
 
   
 
119. If your facility had 
delay or drug availability 
problems, why did this 
occur? 
 
 
1 = Delay in submission of coordinator’s order to the 
Health Directorate (DEMID) 
2 = Communication problems between the ESN-PCT 
coordinator and the facility.  
3 = Lack of stock in the Health Directorate (DEMID) 
storage  
4 = Others 
(more than 
one option can 
be selected) 
120. Comments: 
 
 
 
121. Have you had (or do you have) any objections or limitation 
related to the execution of the promotion component?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
122. Comments: 
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PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF LABORATORY 
 
 123. Average 
days between the 
order and 
receivable of the 
following 
materials/in-kind 
to the facility: 
 
days 
124.  Previous 
knowledge of 
pick up date 
  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
125. Delays 
in receivable of 
materials/in-
kind necessary 
to execute the 
strategy (during 
the last 12 
months). 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
126. Shortages 
of any of the 
following 
materials/in-kind 
(during the last 12 
months) 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
a. Basic fuchsin 
reagents  
    
b. Immersion oil     
c. Microscope slides     
d. Methylene blue     
d. Acid-alcohol     
 
127. If your facility had shortages, how did you solve the problem? 
 
 
 
 
128. In your opinion, why did the shortages occur?  
 
 
 
 
 
 129. Does 
your facility 
have the 
following 
equipment? 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
130. If you do not have the 
following equipment, how do you 
handle the situation?  
1 = Borrow it from a nearby 
facility 
2 = Buy it with petty cash 
3 = Transfer the patient to another 
facility 
4 = Other 
131. If you do not 
have the equipment, 
which institution should 
give it to you? 
1 = MINSA  
2 = DISA 
3 = Network 
4 = Micro-Network 
a. 100x Binocular 
microscope   
   
b. Bunsen burner    
c. Propane tank    
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PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH STRATEGY FOR 
VACCINATIONS (ESN-INMUNIZACIONES) 
 
132. Number of protected persons in 2007  
133. Profession of the person in charge of the strategy in the 
facility 
 
 
 134.  Previous 
knowledge of 
delivery date 
  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
135. Was there a delay in the 
arrival of vaccines/medical inputs 
to execute the strategy once the 
campaign started (last 12 months). 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
If there was a 
delay how long 
was it (in days)  
a. Vaccines    
b. Medical inputs (needles, 
syringes and others)   
 
 
  
 
136. If your facility 
experienced delays or 
vaccine availability 
problems, what was the 
reason? 
1 = Delay in the submission of Network coordinator’s 
order to DISA/DEMID. 
2 = Communication problems between DISA/MINSA and 
the facility.  
3 = Lack of stock in DISA/MINSA storage  
4 = Other 
(more than one 
option can be 
selected) 
137. Comments 
 
 
 
138. Have you had (or do you have) any objection or limitations 
related to the execution of the promotion component? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
139. Comments  
 
 
 
Monetary remittances for the strategy 
 
140. Did you receive remittances for the most 
recent campaign? 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
141. If you received remittances, 
when did they arrive?  
1 = At the end or after the campaign 
2 = During the campaign 
3 = Before or at the beginning of the campaign 
 
142. If you received remittances late, how many days after the start 
of the campaign did you receive remittances? 
days  
143. Did you receive remittances 
for the previous campaign?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
144. If you received remittances, 
when did they arrive? 
1 = At the end or after the campaign 
2 = During the campaign 
3 = Before or at the beginning of the campaign 
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145. When you do not 
receive remittances, how do 
you cover the lack of 
money?   
1 = Petty Cash 
2 = Facility manager’s and/or healthcare personnel own money 
3=  Suppliers’ credit 
4 = Others 
5 = It was not covered 
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Annex 10 – Health Network Survey Template 
 
e) No. of  Survey: 
 
 f) Interview Date:  
g) Name of the person conducting survey 1: 
 
 
h) Name of the person conducting survey 2: 
 
A. Identification of the Facility 
1. Network Name: 
 
2. Department: 
 
3. Province: 
 
4. District: 
 
 
5. Network code:  6. Network Location 
(INEI, location code): 
 
7. Name of the DISA/DIRESA the Network is part 
of: 
 
8. Number of Facilities (I-3) that are under this 
this Network:  
 
 
B. Services description 
 
Information on the Network’s Executive Director 
9. Name of the Executive 
Director: 
 
10. Sex: 1 = Female 
2 = Male 
 11. Type of 
contract: 
1 = Permanent employee 
2 = Contract worker 
 
Years  12. Working experience as Executive Director in 
this Network 
Months  
Years  13. Working experience as Executive Director in 
any Network and/or as Head Doctor in any 
facility: Months  
 
C. Attention hours in Facilities (I – 3) that depend from the Network 
14. Which agency establishes the facilities’ hours of attention?  
 
1 = DISA 
2 = Network 
3 = Micro-Network 
4 = Others 
 
15. Do you have any directive that regulates the hours of attention 
for childbirth?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
16. Comments: 
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D. Collection at the Facility 
 
17. Does every facility have a price list for 
attentions?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
3= Don’t know / not sure 
 
18. Who approves the facilities price list? 1 = DISA 
2 = Network 
3 = Micro Network 
4 = Facility 
 
19. Can the Head Doctors modify the price list? 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
3= Don’t know / not sure 
 
20. What is the main reason that adjustments to 
the price list are requested?  
 
 
E. Population attended by the network 
 
Children  
Teens  
Adults  
21. Population assigned to the 
Network according to stages of 
life (2007) 
Elder Adult  
Children  22. Population attended by the 
Network according to target 
groups (2007) 
Pregnant women  
 
 23. No. of patients (2007) 24. No. of attentions (2007) 
General Medicine   
Obstetrics   
Odontology   
 
 25. No. de insured (2007) 26. No. of attentions (2007) 
Integral Health Insurance (SIS)   
 
F. Autonomy of Network’s Executive Director 
 
27. Do you consider that you have autonomy in relation to 
these issues? 
From 1 to 5, when 1 is zero autonomy and 5 is great 
autonomy, rate your level of autonomy in each of the 
following:  
Issues 
1 2 3 4 5 
xi. Human resources and schedule 
allocation within the facilities 
     
xii. Establishment of the price list for 
the facilities 
     
xiii. In-kind purchases      
xiv. In-kind allocation within the 
facilities  
     
xv. Equipment purchases      
xvi. Equipment allocation within the 
facilities 
     
xvii. Drug allocation within the facilities      
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viii. Establishment of the amount of 
petty cash and delivery to the 
facilities  
     
xix. Use and control of facilities petty 
cash  
     
 
G. Network diagnosis (considering facilities) 
 
28. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most 
important problems that the 
facilities within the Network 
face in relation to human 
resources?  
1 = Lack of personnel 
2 = High personnel rotation 
3 = Personnel with insufficient 
qualifications 
4 = Lack of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives 
5 = Others (specify)  
6 = No problems 
Example: 1,4 
29. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most 
important problems that the 
facilities within the Network 
face in relation to drugs?  
1 = Non-fulfillment/Ignorance of proper 
storage practices 
2 = Inadequate infrastructure 
3 = Delays in notification about drugs ready 
for pick up from DISA 
4 = Lack of availability in DISA  
5 = Others (specify) 
6 = No problem 
 
30. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most 
important problems that the 
facilities within the Network 
face in relation to in-kind 
supplies?  
1 = Delays in the receival of in-kind 
2 = Reductions in the amount of in-kind 
received 
3 = Deliveries of unrequested in-kind 
4 = Others (specify) 
5 = No problem 
 
31. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most 
important problems that the 
facilities in the Network face in 
relation to  the National Health 
Strategy for Tuberculosis 
Prevention and Control?  
1 = Lack of equipment  
2 = Delays or reductions in the amount of 
drugs in facilities  
3 = Biosecurity 
4 = Others (specify) 
5 = No problem 
 
32. Which of the following do you 
consider the two most 
important problems that the 
facilities in the Network face in 
relation to the Network 
regarding the Vaccination 
Program 
1 = Lack of equipment 
2 = Delays in the arrival of remittances 
3 = Delays or reductions in the amount of 
vaccines 
4 = Others (specify) 
5 = No problem 
 
 
33. In relation to the topics from above. What do you think are the limitations that the Network has in 
terms of solving these problems?  
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 PERSON IN CHARGE OF PERSONNEL OR IN-KIND 
 
H. Network personnel (who work in Network administration and in facilities I - 3) 
 
Network Administrative Personnel   Network Personnel (que labora en los Centros de Salud) 34. Availability of human resources by 
professional group or technicians  
2008 (number)  
(1) 
Permanent 
employees
(2) 
Contract 
workers 
Total (use only in case 
information on the number 
of personnel is not broken 
down by type of contract , 
column 1 or 2) 
(1) 
Permanent 
employees
(2) 
Contract 
worker 
Total (use only in case information on 
the number of personnel is not broken 
down by type of contract) 
Total that work at the facility:       
i.Doctors       
ii.Nurses       
iii.Midwives       
iv.Dentists       
v.Social work assistants        
vi.Psychologists       
vii.Others health professionals       
viii.X-rays technicians       
ix.Laboratory technicians        
x.Nursing technicians       
xi.Pharmacy technicians        
xii.Sanitary Inspectors       
xiii.Administrative technicians       
xiv.Statistics technicians        
xv.Transportation technicians       
xvi.Statistics assistants        
xvii.Service workers       
xviii.Craftsmen       
xix.Health service assistants       
xx.Cleaning personnel       
xxi.Other technicians or assistants       
xxii.SERUMS (rural or marginal urban       
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health service)  
xxiii.PAAG (Program for the Admin.  of 
Managements Agreements)  
      
xxiv.       
xxv.       
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I. Payment to Network personnel (who work in Network administration and in facilities I 
– 3, CMI) 
 
35. Are all the personnel paid through Multired, Banco de 
la Nación? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
36. Are payments for productivity are also paid through 
Banco de la Nación? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
37. Explain: 
 
 
For the last twelve 
months: 
38. Was there a delay in 
payment of personnel? 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
39. How often did delays 
take place? 
 
1 = Never 
2 = Once 
3 = Between 2 and 3 times 
4 = Between 4 and 6 times 
40. If there were 
delays, on average 
how long were 
they in days? 
 
 
a. Permanent 
employee 
   
b. Contract worker    
 
41. If there were delays, why did they occur? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J. Personnel working in Network administration and in facilities  
42. From the beginning of 2007 to date: Did the 
Network submit official requests for more 
personnel in the following categories of 
professionals or technicians? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
43. Categories of 
professionals or 
technicians that were 
requested 
44. How many 
official requests 
were made in each 
category?  
(number) 
45. How many 
official 
requests were 
approved?  
(number) 
46. How much time passed 
from the submission of the 
official request and its 
approval?  
(months) 
i.     
ii.     
iii.     
iv.     
v.     
vi.     
vii.     
viii.     
 
47. In general, if there was a delay in the approval of the official request, why do you think this happened?  
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48. Do you think your control system for attendance allows you supervise properly? 
 
 
 
 
 
51. Reason for the visits : 49. Since the beginning of the year to 
date, has the Network received 
visits from the following 
institutions?   
50. How 
many 
visits? 
1 = Supervision of personnel  
2 = Evaluation of biosecurity conditions, number 
of personnel, work conditions, number of 
personnel, etc  
3 = Petty cash balance  
 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Number 1 2 3 
C.S. Delicias de Villa  
 
     
C.S. San Genaro de Villa 
 
     
C.S. Santiago de Surco 
 
     
C.S. Alicia Lastres 
 
     
C.S. Gaudencio Bernasconi 
 
     
 
52. What were the recommendations after the visits?  
a  
 
b  
 
c  
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PERSON IN CHARGE OF ADMINISTRATION / LOGISTICS  
 
K. Utilities 
 
53. During the last 12 months, were your 
utilities cut or did you receive a 
notice of a cut due to delay in  
payment?  
1 = Never 
2 = Once  
3 = Between two and three times 
4 = More than three times 
 i.Water and 
sewage 
ii.Electricity iii.Telephone iv. Local 
taxes 
C.S. Delicias de Villa  
 
    
C.S. San Genaro de Villa 
 
    
C.S. Santiago de Surco 
 
    
C.S. Alicia Lastres 
 
    
C.S. Gaudencio Bernasconi 
 
    
 
 
L. Petty Cash (administrated by the facilities) 
 
Petty cash - Own collected resources 
 
 Integral Health 
Insurance (SIS) 
54. When did you 
send the petty 
cash 
corresponding 
to the 
following 
periods?   
Month/day 
(enter 0 if you did 
not send it) 
55. How much did you 
send as petty cash 
to the facilities?  
 
(soles) 
56. After sending the 
petty cash, how 
many days were 
left to the 
facilities for 
accountability?  
Month/day 
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. 
Delicias de 
Villa iii. March 2008    
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. San 
Genaro de 
Villa iii. March 2008    
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. 
Santiago de 
Surco iii. March 2008    
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. Alicia 
Lastres 
iii. March 2008    
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. 
Gaudencio 
Bernasconi iii. March 2008    
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Petty Cash - INTEGRAL HEALTH INSURANCE (SIS)  
 
 Months:  57. When did you 
send petty cash 
corresponding 
to the 
following 
periods?   
Month / day 
(enter 0 if you did 
not send it) 
58. How much did you 
send as petty cash 
to the facilities? 
(soles) 
59. After receiving 
cash, how many 
days were left to 
the facilities for 
accountability?  
Day / month 
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. 
Delicias de 
Villa iii. March 2008    
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. San 
Genaro 
iii. March 2008    
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. 
Santiago de 
Surco iii. March 2008    
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. Alicia 
Lastres 
iii. March 2008    
i. January 2008    
ii. February 2008    
C.S. 
Gaudencio 
Bernasconi iii. March 2008    
 
 
 
M. Goods for consumption 
 
 
60. What are the five goods 
most consumed by facilities? 
61. Did you experience
shortages of any of these goods? 
1 = Yes 
2 =No 
62. How long did the 
shortage last?  
(days) 
i.  
 
  
ii.   
iii.   
iv.   
v.   
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63. If there was a shortage, why did it occur? 64. How did the facilities solve their shortage 
problems? 
  
  
  
65. Does any medical service pick up their goods directly from the 
Network or the Micro-Network? For example: doctor's office, laboratories, 
programs, etc. 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
 
N. Equipment 
 
 66. Have you received any 
requests for additional 
equipment and/or 
furniture from the 
following facilities? 
67. When did 
you 
receive 
the 
requests? 
68. Currently, 
has a 
decision on 
the request 
been made?  
69. If the 
request was 
approved, 
when was 
the item(s) 
sent? 
 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Month /year 1 = Yes 
2= No 
Month /year 
C.S. Delicias de Villa      
C.S. San Genaro de 
Villa 
    
C.S. Santiago de Surco     
C.S. Alicia Lastres     
C.S. Gaudencio 
Bernasconi 
    
 
70. Has the Network requested additional equipment and/or furniture? 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
Types of equipment and/or furniture 
requested 
71. When did 
you make 
the request? 
72. Currently, has 
a decision on 
the request 
been made? 
73. If the request was 
approved, when 
was the item(s) 
received? 
(name) Month /year 1 = Yes 
2= No 
Month /year 
i.     
ii.     
iii.     
 
74. Has the Network ever received equipment or furniture that 
was not requested or needed? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
75. Comments: 
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 INTEGRAL HEALTH INSURANCE (SIS) DATA INPUT STAFF MEMBER,   WORKING AT THE NETWORK  
 
O. Public insurance reimbursement for the attention of SIS patients 
 
 Months 76. In the following 
months, how many 
reimbursement 
forms were sent by 
the facilities? 
77.  How many 
reimbursement 
forms were 
approved by the 
Network? 
(preventive quality 
control 
78. How many 
reimbursement forms 
were approved by 
SIS? 
79. How much was 
reimbursed by 
SIS?  
       (soles) 
80. When was it 
reimbursed? (Take 
into account the 
number of 
installments in which 
it was received) 
Example: February and 
April 
January 2008      
February 2008      
C.S. 
Delicias de 
Villa March 2008      
January 2008      
February 2008      
C.S. San 
Genaro de 
Villa 
March 2008      
January 2008      
February 2008      
C.S. 
Santiago 
de Surco 
March 2008      
January 2008      
February 2008      
C.S. Alicia 
Lastres 
March 2008      
January 2008      
February 2008      
C.S. 
Gaudencio 
Bernasconi 
March 2008      
O
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 PERSON IN CHARGE OF GENERAL CASH 
 
P. Collections for medical services by facilities 
 
  81. How much was deposited into the Network’s 
account for medical services? (last three months, 
in soles)  
January 2008  
February 2008  
C.S. Delicias de Villa 
March 2008  
January 2008  
February 2008  
C.S. San Genaro de 
Villa 
March 2008  
January 2008  
February 2008  
C.S. Santiago de Surco 
March 2008  
January 2008  
February 2008  
C.S. Alicia Lastres 
March 2008  
January 2008  
February 2008  
C.S. Gaudencio 
Bernasconi 
March 2008  
 
82. How frequently are resources collected for 
medical services deposited into the Network’s 
account?  
1 = Daily 
2 = Weekly 
3 = Other (specify) 
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PERSON IN CHARGE OF PHARMACY  
 
Q. Drug and vaccine storages 
83. Does the Network have a storeroom or space assigned 
for the drugs received from DISA? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
84. Does the Network have a storeroom or space assigned 
for the vaccines received from DISA? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
85. Who registers the vaccines that there are in the 
storeroom? (Fill in the control stock card) 
1= National Program 
coordinators  
2 = Person in charge of the 
storage 
3= Both  
 
86. Have you had (or do you have) any objections or limitation regarding storage/management of drugs 
or vaccines stock? 
 
 
 
R. Drugs 
87. Did you know in advance when you should pick up drugs from 
the DISA?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
88. In the last quarter, what was the percentage of drugs in NORMAL 
STOCK? ( between 4 and 6 months’ supply)  
%  
89. In the last quarter,  what was the percentage of drugs in SUB 
STOCK?(between 1 and 4 months’ supply) 
%  
90. In the last quarter,  what was the percentage of drugs in UNDER 
STOCK? (less than 1 month’ supply) 
%  
91. In relation to delivieries of drugs, choose the 
most frequently occurring situation from the 
following list:  
1 = Delivers the complete order at 
the expected date.  
2 = Delivers the complete order 
with a delay  
3 = Delivers an incomplete order at 
the expected date. 
4 = Delivers an incomplete order 
with a delay.   
 
 
92. What are the five drugs most 
frequently needed by the facilities? 
93. In the last 12 months, 
have the drugs 
mentioned been affected 
by shortages? 
94. If the answer is yes, how 
many days did the 
shortage last? Take into 
account all occurrences.    
Name 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
days 
i.  
 
  
ii.   
iii.   
iv.   
v.   
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95. Does the Network have any control system for the 
expired drugs? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
96. Who decides on the drug price list?   1 = Central level (DIGEMID) 
2 = DISA / DIRESA (Executive 
Direction of Drugs) 
3 = Network 
4 = Micro-Network 
5 = Other (specify) 
 
97. Do all the facilities have a price list? 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
98. During this year, has the Network 
visited the following facilities to 
collect information about drugs? 
99. How 
many 
visits? 
 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Number 
100. What were the motives for the visits? 
1 = To verify use of the price list by the 
facilities.  
2 = To verify that the facility does not store
expired medicine. 
3 = To verify the stock of drugs. 
C.S. Delicias de Villa     
C.S. San Genaro de Villa 
 
   
C.S. Santiago de Surco    
C.S. Alicia Lastres    
C.S. Gaudencio Bernasconi    
 
101. What recommendations were made after the visits?   
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PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH STRATEGY FOR 
TUBERCULOSIS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (ESN-PCT) 
 
 
102. Number of cases diagnosed in 2007  
103. Profession the person in charge of ESN-PCT in the facility  
 
 104. Average 
number days between 
order submission and 
the arrival of drugs 
from DEMID/ the 
hospital (MDR) 
 
days 
105. Previous 
knowledge of 
pick up date 
  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
106. Delay in 
the arrival of drugs 
during the last 12 
months. 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
107. Shortage of  
any of Tuberculosis 
drugs during last 12 
months 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
i. Primary Plan 
(EP) 
    
ii. Multidrug-
resistant 
(MDR) 
    
 
 
108. If your facility presents 
delay or drug availability problems, 
why did this occur? 
1 = Communication problems between 
facilities. 
2 = Lack of stock in DISA/DEMID 
storage. 
3 = Other 
  
(more than one option can 
be selected) 
109. Comments: 
 
 
 
 
110.  Have you had (or do you have) any objections or limitations 
related to the execution of the promotion component? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
111. Comments: 
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PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF LABORATORY 
 
 112. Average days 
between the order and 
the arrival of the 
following materials/in-
kind to the facility: 
days 
113. Delay in the 
receival of 
materials/in-kind 
necessary to execute 
the strategy (during 
the last 12 months). 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
114. Shortages of 
any of the following 
materials/in-kind 
(during the last 12 
months) 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
i. Basic fuchsin reagents    
ii. Immersion oil    
iii. Microscopic slides    
iv. Methylene blue    
v. Acid-Alcohol    
 
 
115. If your facilities had shortages, how did you solve the problem? 
 
 
 
 
116. In your opinion, why did these shortages occur? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 117. Do all the facilities have the 
following equipment? 
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
118. If they do have have the 
equipment, which institution 
should provide it? 
1 = MINSA  
2 = DISA 
3 = Network 
4 = Micro-Network 
i. 100x Binocular 
microscope   
  
ii. Bunsen burner    
iii. Propane tank   
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PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH STRATEGY FOR 
VACCINATIONS (ESN-INMUNIZACIONES) 
 
 
119.  Number of protected persons in 2007  
120. Profession of the person in charge of the strategy in the facility  
  
 121. Did facilities have 
previous knowledge of 
delivery date?   
  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
 
122. Was 
there a delay in 
the arrival of 
vaccines/medical 
inputs to execute 
the strategy once 
the campaign 
started (last 12 
months)? 
1 = Yes 2 = No 
123. If there 
was a delay, 
how long did it 
last (in days)? 
 
i. Vaccines    
ii. Medical inputs (needles, 
syringes, and others)   
   
 
124. If your facility experienced delays or 
vaccine availability problems, what was the 
reason? 
1 = Communication problems with 
the facilities. 
2 = Lack of stock in DISA/MINSA 
storage 
3 = Others 
(more than one 
option can be 
selected) 
125. Comments: 
 
 
126.  Have you had (or do you have) any objections or limitation 
related to the executions of the promotion component?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
127. Comments: 
 
 
Monetary remittances to the Strategy 
 
128. Have you received remittances for the 
most recent campaign? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
129. If you received remittances, 
when did they arrive? 
1 = At the end or after the campaign 
2 = During the campaign 
3 = Before or at the beginning of the campaign 
 
130. If you received remittances late, how many days after the start 
of the campaign did you receive remittances? 
days  
131. Did you receive remittances 
for the previous campaign? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
132. If you received remittances, 
when did they arrive? 
1 = At the end or after the campaign 
2 = During the campaign 
3 = Before or at the beginning of the campaign 
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133. When you do not 
receive remittances, how 
do the facilities cover the 
lack of money?   
1 = Petty Cash 
2 = Facility manager’s and/or healthcare personnel’s own 
money 
3=  Supplier’s credit 
4 = Others 
5 = It was not covered 
 
 
 
 
